"That's an Interesting Finding, but...:"  Postsecondary Students' Interpretations of Research Findings. by Burrage, Marie S.
                                                                      







“That’s an interesting finding, but….:” 









A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Education and Psychology) 











Associate Professor Priti R. Shah, Chair 
Professor Daniel P. Keating 
Professor Kevin F. Miller 







                                                                      





















                                                                      




I’d like to thank my dissertation committee for their feedback and advice as I work on 
this project. I’d especially like to thank the chair of my committee and my advisor, Priti 
Shah. Without Priti’s help and support, this dissertation would not have been possible. 
Thank you to my family, friends and Dan for their love and support throughout this 





















                                                                      
      
iii 
 




List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................... v 
List of Appendices ............................................................................................................. vi 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………1 
      Important of Evidence Interpretation Skills.................................................................. 1 
      Theory-Evidence Coordination Model ......................................................................... 4 
      Epistemic Belief and Thinking Dispositions ................................................................ 6 
      Higher Education ........................................................................................................ 10 
      Current Research..........................................................................................................11 
Chapter 2: Study 1………………………………………………………………….........14 
      Introduction................................................................................................................. 14 
      Methodology............................................................................................................... 17 
      Results......................................................................................................................... 21 
      Discussion................................................................................................................... 24 
Chapter 3: Study 2……………………………………………………………………….27 
      Introduction................................................................................................................. 27 
      Pilot Study................................................................................................................... 31 
      Methodology............................................................................................................... 39 
      Results......................................................................................................................... 41 
      Discussion................................................................................................................... 50 
Chapter 4: General Discussion ......................................................................................... 54 
Tables................................................................................................................................ 62 













                                                                      
      
 iv 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Study 1 Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................. 62 
Table 2: Pilot Study Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................... 63 
Table 3: Participants Frequencies for Study 2 .................................................................. 64 
Table 4: ANOVA Results for Lab vs. Non-Lab Participants ........................................... 65 
Table 5: Study 2 Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................. 66 
Table 6: Vignete Descriptive Statistics by Year in College ............................................. 67 
Table 7: Vignette Descriptive Statistics by Major............................................................ 68 
Table 8: Disposition, Belief and Ability Descriptive Statistics by Year in College......... 69 
Table 9: Disposition, Belief and Ability Descriptive Statistics by Major ........................ 70 
Table 10: Interest Item Descriptive Statistics by Year in College.................................... 71 
Table 11: Interest Item Descriptive Statistics by Major ................................................... 72 
Table12: Familiarity with Statistics/Methods Item Descriptives by Year in College ...... 73 
Table 13: Familiarity with Statistics/Methods Item Descriptives by Major..................... 74 
Table 14: Percentages of People who Recognized Flaws by Year in College and Major.75 
Table 15: Correlations with Non-Vignette Data............................................................... 76 
Table 16: Correlations with Vignette Data ....................................................................... 77 























                                                                      




List of Figures 
 
Figure 1. Study 1: Descriptions of Data ........................................................................... 79 
Figure 2. Study 1: Evaluations of Data............................................................................. 80 
Figure 3. Study 1: Explanations of Data........................................................................... 81 
Figure 4. Study 1: Descriptions of Data by Type of Graph.............................................. 82 
Figure 5. Study 1: Evaluations of Data by Type of Graph ............................................... 83 
Figure 6. Study 1: Explanations of Data by Type of Graph ............................................. 84 
Figure 7. Study 2: Vignette Interpretation by Type of Instruction ................................... 85 
Figure 8. Study 2: Vignette Interpretation by Type of Flaw ............................................ 86 
Figure 9. Study 2: Vignette Interpretation by Year in College......................................... 87 






                                                                      
      
 vi 
 
List of Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Study 1 Vignettes ........................................................................................ 89 
Appendix B: Pilot Study Vignettes................................................................................... 97 
Appendix C: Study 2 Vignettes ........................................................................................ 99 
Appendix D: Actively Open-Minded Thinking Questionnaire ...................................... 101 
Appendix E: Need for Cognition Questionnaire............................................................. 104 
Appendix F: Epistemic Belief Inventory ........................................................................ 106 





















                                                                      




Two studies examined individuals’ open-ended interpretations of research 
findings in the context of Deanna Kuhn’s model of theory-evidence coordination. The 
first study compared undergraduate and graduate students’ explanations and evaluations 
of research findings in familiar and unfamiliar domains. The second study considered the 
role of epistemic beliefs and thinking dispositions on less and more advanced college 
students’ interpretations of research findings.  
Results from both studies indicated that some people tended to focus more on the 
evaluation of evidence presented to them while others accepted the evidence at face value 
and focused on explanation, attempting to “make sense” of the research findings in terms 
of what they already knew (prior theories and beliefs). Educational experience was 
related to people’s interpretation of the research findings. More advanced students tended 
to describe and critically evaluate data while less advanced students explained the data 
without considering their quality. Additionally, there were differences in the way students 
with different majors/areas of study interpreted research findings, with history and 
engineering students providing more evaluations of the findings than psychology 
students. Finally, correlational and regression analyses indicated that 
statistical/methodological training, general intelligence and sophisticated thinking 
dispositions were correlated with people’s tendency to evaluate research findings. 
                                                                      





Importance of Evidence Interpretation Skills  
In today’s “Information Age” individuals are bombarded with data that they must 
use to make reasoned decisions in a broad range of contexts, such as what kind of 
medical treatment to select for oneself or loved one, who to vote for, and what brand of 
child safety seat to purchase. Nonetheless, even highly educated adults have difficulty 
reasoning with data. Halpern (1998) reviewed literature indicating that large percentages 
(70-99%) of people in the American public believe in paranormal phenomena for which 
the evidence is sparse and flawed. For example, in a study of college students, more than 
99% claimed to believe in at least one of many paranormal phenomena including 
channeling, psychic healing, and UFOs, with more than 65% reporting that they 
personally experienced at least one of these things (Messer & Griggs, 1989). 
 Even expert scientists make reasoning errors. Studies of trained psychologists 
have shown that, while the psychologists are quick to criticize experimental designs with 
small samples sizes, they will accept their own anecdotal and personal experiences as 
credible sources of data (Dawes, 1994). Many people do not seek out data that might 
disprove their strongly held beliefs; however, even those who do are likely to struggle 
with interpretation of these data. For example, a Life magazine article (Miller, 1997) 
described the experience of a man described as a physicist-astrologer. This man claimed 
that he considered astrology to be “useless poppycock” (p. 46) until he began to see the 
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data; however, the data that changed his mind were “a few, small, but significant 
correlations” (p. 46) amongst many non-significant correlations. In this case, it was not a 
lack of data that led this man to his faulty conclusions, it was a misinterpretation of the 
data he did have.   
Although careful interpretation of evidence is a crucial aspect of everyday critical 
thinking and scientific reasoning, people clearly struggle with this process. Therefore, a 
fundamental goal of both K-12 and higher education is improving these skills in students 
(Halpern, 2001; Solomon & Perkins, 1989).  To this end, improving everyday scientific 
reasoning skills is a stated goal of the "National Educational Goals" promoted by the 
National Governor's Council and President Bush (Halpern, 2001).  
There is a wide range of errors that people make when interpreting evidence. In 
the current project, the evidence presented to people takes the form of research findings. I 
decided to focus on this domain because it is relevant to everyday, real world reasoning 
contexts. People are consistently exposed to new research findings in popular media 
outlets such as newspaper articles and the nightly news, and they must interpret these 
research findings to the best of their abilities. As in with any new piece of information, 
people interpret new research finding in light of what they already know and believe 
(Vosniadou, 1994). Most of the research findings presented in popular media outlets 
concern topics about which people have preexisting beliefs, and one common issue is 
that, when interpreting research findings, people tend to let their prior beliefs and theories 
interfere with their ability to evaluate the data at hand (Klaczynski, 2000). Because of 
this, they may not recognize a wide range of potential problems with the evidence, 
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ranging from flaws in the experimental methodology to over-interpretation of the 
research findings by the author of the piece.  
For example, when interpreting experimental data, people in Klaczynski’s (2000) 
study fell into a belief bias trap that left them “blind” to explicit validity threats, selection 
bias, and a questionable construct. For example, when upper middle class participants 
were presented with a description of an experiment indicating that the upper middle class 
was somehow “superior” in some way to the working class, they tended not to recognize 
that upper middle class subjects had been selected in a very different context (they were 
in a business setting) than the working class subjects (they were at a rally). 
Other research has focused on the difficulties that people have with specific kinds 
of statistical and methodological reasoning problems. For example, Hatfield and Faunce 
(2006) describe the confusion that often arises when interpreting correlational data. They 
emphasize that students have problems learning to distinguish between the concepts of 
correlation and causation in the context of statistical and methodological courses. 
Additionally, Barry Leshowitz (1989) examined the methodological reasoning of 
undergraduate students, and found that, before participating in a psychology research 
methods class, the students had trouble with topics such as operational definitions, 
sampling, predictive relationships and controlled comparisons. However, to my 
knowledge, there isn’t a body of research that compares people’s recognition of these 
different types of statistical and methodological errors. 
In the current project, I propose to examine the processes that people engage in 
when interpreting research findings using the model described below. Because people are 
frequently exposed to research findings and scientific data in their everyday lives, it is 
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crucial that I gain a better understanding of how they are interpreting this information, 
especially when the information is flawed in some way. Therefore, it is a primary goal of 
this project to apply Deanna Kuhn’s research on evidence vs. explanation-based 
reasoning in this new domain with the hopes of developing a more systematic way of 
thinking about people’s interpretation of research findings. A second goal of the current 
research is to investigate individual factors, such as intelligence, thinking dispositions 
and amount and type of higher education (especially in the domains of statistics and 
research methodology), that contribute to stronger and weaker evidence interpretation 
processes. Hopefully by gaining insight into what people do when presented with 
research findings and why, we can move towards a better understanding of how evidence 
evaluation processes might ultimately be improved.  
Theory-Evidence Coordination Model 
Research on justifying knowledge claims has shown that people tend to focus on 
providing theoretically-based explanations of why their claims are valid as opposed to 
providing evidence that supports their claims. In other words, people tend to prefer to 
answer the question “Why is it so?” as opposed to “How do you know?” when justifying 
a claim. Deanna Kuhn and others have also found that, in certain circumstances, these 
explanations can lead to overconfidence, can inhibit examination of alternatives and can 
be false (Kuhn, 2001).  
For example, in her research on jury decision-making, Kuhn and her colleagues 
have explored the way that jurors make and justify claims about verdict choices. They 
have found that jurors commonly rely on narrative explanations of what happened and 
select their verdict choices based on that explanation; however, they did find individual 
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variation in use of evidence to justify claims. In other research, Kuhn and others have 
examined individual difference factors that they believe contribute to the tendency to 
engage in evidence-based reasoning. In a study with both young children and adult jurors, 
she has found that those with more sophisticated epistemic beliefs, tended to rely more 
heavily on evidence that those with less sophisticated epistemic beliefs (Kuhn, 
Weinstock, & Flaton, 1994). The role of epistemic beliefs in explanation vs. evidenced-
based reasoning is discussed in greater detail in the following section of this introduction. 
Kuhn and others have also found that those with greater amounts of higher education 
(e.g. advanced college students) are more likely to prefer evidence to explanation (Brem 
& Rips, 2000; Kuhn, 2001). Kuhn’s research on evidence-based reasoning is framed in 
terms of a model of theory-evidence coordination.  
Kuhn’s model of theory-evidence coordination, which she claims is a cornerstone 
of scientific reasoning as well as critical thinking more generally, outlines one way that 
people can reason using theory and evidence. For those using a theory-evidence 
coordination model to select/reconsider a theory, evidence figures heavily, multiple 
alternatives are considered, and the alternative that has the highest quality and most 
consistent evidence associated with it is the alternative that is chosen. This stands in 
contrast to a satisficing model, in which the construction of a plausible narrative is 
sufficient to dictate a corresponding choice, evidence inconsistent with this narrative is 
disregarded, and alternatives are not considered. These two models dictate very different 
roles for evidence in reasoning. According to Kuhn, in order to reason competently, 
whether it be in the domain of legal reasoning, scientific reasoning, or informal 
reasoning, one must be able to coordinate one’s theories with new evidence bearing on 
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them. In order to do this, one must have the ability to reflect on his/her theories as objects 
of cognition (distinct from external sources of evidence) to an extent sufficient to 
recognize that they could be wrong. Also, one must be able to recognize external sources 
of evidence that could disconfirm his/her theory and to carefully evaluate that evidence. 
Therefore, one must understand and value the role of quality evidence in proving or 
disproving a theory.  
Many reasoning errors arise from belief bias, defined as individuals’ inability to 
separate their prior expectations and beliefs from the quality of information presented to 
them. These errors are closely related to the tendency to reason in an overly theory-driven 
way. For example, belief-bias occurs when people are more critical of evidence that they 
do not believe or expect, and are less critical of evidence that they do believe (Edwards & 
Smith, 1996; Klaczynski, 2000; Lord, Ross & Leper, 1979). They are more likely to 
evaluate arguments as demonstrating solid reasoning when they agree with them than 
when they do not.  And, they find it easier to generate arguments supporting their 
viewpoints than to generate counter-arguments (Toplak & Stanovich, 2003). Research on 
belief-bias has found that those operating in more advanced stages of epistemic 
development (i.e. are able to effectively distinguish between subjective and objective 
components of knowing) are less likely to fall into belief-bias traps (Stanovich & West, 
1997).  
Epistemic beliefs and thinking dispositions 
Virtually all critical thinking researchers would agree that one’s thoughts and 
beliefs about knowledge are predictors of one’s ability to think critically.  Deanna Kuhn’s 
work has gone so far as to call thinking “an epistemological enterprise.” Her work 
                                                                      
      
 7 
 
emphasizes the importance of reflection on one’s own thinking process to producing 
good thinking, and she draws from work on the development of epistemological 
understanding by Perry and King and Kitchner. Kuhn’s research shows that there is a 
clear relationship between epistemological beliefs and quality of argument skills. 
Additionally, Kuhn reviews research demonstrating that epistemological beliefs influence 
the ways that people both use their intellectual skills, and acquire new knowledge.  
Kuhn presents a stage model of epistemological beliefs with four basic levels: 
realist, absolutist, multiplist and evaluative. The original version of this theory was 
primarily concerned with the development of epistemological beliefs over the college 
years, centered on development of beliefs about of how knowledge and truth are 
constructed. When one is at the realist level, one believes that knowledge is certain, 
easily knowable and comes from a single expert source; therefore, evidence evaluation is 
unnecessary.  At the absolutist level, evidence evaluation becomes a tool for “comparing 
assertions to reality and determining their truth or falsehood.” At this level, one believes 
that reality is still directly knowable. However, as one progresses to the multiplist level, 
the certainty of knowledge and reality is called into question. One comes to believe that 
knowledge is a product of human minds, and is, therefore, subjective and uncertain. At 
this stage evidence evaluation becomes irrelevant because there is no way of comparing 
assertions. Finally, at the evaluative level, critical thinking and evidence evaluation are 
once again valued as a tool that allows one to come up with sound assertions, examine 
multiple perspectives, and find informed answers to one’s questions. Only at the most 
advanced, evaluative level is knowledge seen to consist of claims, which require support 
in a framework of alternatives, evidence, and argument (Chandler, Boyes, & Ball, 1990; 
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Kuhn, 1999). The cognitive task underlying this evolution is the coordination of the 
objective and subjective components of knowing (Kuhn, 2001). This is what allows one 
to use an appropriate mix of theory and evidence to justify a claim. 
  Kuhn makes the argument that people’s epistemic beliefs shape intellectual 
values and hence the disposition to utilize intellectual skills (Kuhn, 2001). Therefore, 
thinking dispositions act to link epistemic beliefs and abilities in the context of critical 
thinking. While critical thinking researchers do not deny the role of intelligence in 
producing critical thinking, they argue that intelligence needs be accompanied by 
dispositions to use that intelligence to engage in critical thinking (Kuhn, 2001; Stanovich, 
1997). It is the combination of general intelligence and thinking dispositions that produce 
the best critical thinking.  
Baron (1987) introduces a theory of rationality and intelligence that emphasizes 
the role of thinking dispositions in producing good thinking and reasoning. In Baron’s 
view, thinking dispositions are more malleable than cognitive abilities, and are, therefore, 
more teachable. He thinks of them as cognitive styles, although they are also abilities in 
that they reflect a definition of how to be successful. Baron, Badgio and Gaskins (1986) 
show that one consistent characteristic of poor students is that they tend to be defensive 
of their incorrect beliefs, whereas good students are able to remain open to alternative 
views and criticism. Actively open-minded thinking is central to Baron’s concept of 
critical thinking, and, therefore, dispositions to be sensitive and responsive to new 
information, and search out and examine multiple points of view are crucial to his 
understanding of what allows an individual to engage in rational thinking.  
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In their work on reasoning biases, Stanovich (e.g. Stanovich& West, 1997) and 
Klaczynski (e.g. Klaczynski, 2000) have explored the role of thinking dispositions in 
avoiding some of the most common critical thinking errors. Their research has shown that 
high scores on actively open-minded thinking as well as on need for cognition 
(Caccioppo & Petty, 1982) positively predict ability to successfully avoid belief-biased 
reasoning, an important component of critical thinking. Stanovich’s concept of actively 
open-minded thinking stands in contrast to absolutism (belief in one right answer), 
dogmatism, and categorical thinking. These are similar to belief concepts identified in 
Kuhn’s model of epistemological belief development. Need for cognition is a strong 
motivation to engage in intellectually challenging thought and activity (Caccioppo & 
Petty, 1982), and it also thought to be important to one’s ability to think critically (Baron, 
1987).  
The current project attempts to apply research on epistemic beliefs and thinking 
dispositions to the domain of interpretation of research findings. It follows from the 
evidence presented above, indicating that sophisticated epistemic beliefs and thinking 
dispositions such as actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition are predictive 
of people’s ability to think critically in a wide variety of contexts, that these belief and 
dispositions will be predictive of people’s ability to think critically about research 
findings. According to Kuhn’s model of theory-evidence coordination, thinking critically 
about research findings would involve paying attention to the evidence at hand and 
evaluating it carefully. In this research, I attempt to determine whether evaluative 
epistemic beliefs and actively open-minded, cognitively engaged thinking dispositions 
are predictive of people’s evidence-based reasoning about research findings.  
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Higher education  
Research has shown that amount of higher education is related to sophisticated 
epistemic beliefs and to the ability to think critically. For example, Jehng, Johnson & 
Anderson (1993) conducted a study looking at students’ epistemological beliefs as a 
function of their education level and field of study. They found that students in the “soft” 
fields such as social sciences, arts and humanities had more sophisticated epistemic 
beliefs than those in the “hard” sciences, tending to believe that knowledge is uncertain 
and to rely on their independent reasoning skills. They also found that graduate students 
possessed more sophisticated epistemic beliefs than did undergraduates. In another 
example, Toplak and Stanovich (2003) conducted a study examining belief-bias in 
undergraduate students. They found that the amount of belief bias that the students 
demonstrated decreased systematically with year in university. Finally, Brem and Rips 
found that the preference for explanations (over evidence) disappears in highly able 
college students under certain contexts (Brem& Rips, 2000). 
 Research has also shown that discipline-specific higher educational experiences 
differentially affect statistical and methodological reasoning. Lehman, Lempert & Nisbett 
(1988) and Lehman & Nisbett (1990) conducted two studies showing that both 
undergraduate and graduate education have significant effects on reasoning ability. In 
their 1988 study, they found that graduate training in both psychology and medicine 
significantly positively affected statistical and methodological reasoning, and 
psychology, medical and law training significantly positively affected conditional 
reasoning, while chemistry training had no effect on any of the types of reasoning 
studied. In their 1990 study, they found that undergraduate social science training 
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significantly positively affected statistical and methodological reasoning, whereas natural 
science and humanities training produced smaller, but still marginally significant, effects. 
Natural science and humanities training significantly positively affected ability to reason 
about problems in conditional logic, whereas social science training did not. In the 
current study I are particularly interested in statistical and methodological training and 
people’s ability to recognize statistical and methodological errors that I build into my task 
in study 2. 
Current Research 
The current research extends work on explanation vs. evidence-based reasoning to an 
area that is relevant to the field of critical thinking as well as scientific reasoning: 
interpretation of research findings. The set of skills that I am interested in is required of 
people on a day-to-day basis when reading the newspaper or watching the news.  People 
encounter findings from research studies in many popular media outlets, and they must 
interpret these results based on the small amount of information provided in the article or 
news story. I am interested in better understanding how and why people proceed with 
their interpretations of research findings, and I use Kuhn’s model of theory-evidence 
coordination to frame my research questions and hypotheses. Kuhn’s model emphasizes 
that, in order to think scientifically, one must be able to distinguish theory from evidence 
and must be able to examine evidence independent of prior belief and theories. If one 
either disregards or readily accepts evidence, one misses a crucial step in the reasoning 
process (Kuhn, 2001). 
Previous research has primarily focused on people’s attempts to justify claims by 
creating or identifying explanations or evidence (Kuhn, 2001). But what happens when 
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the evidence already exists as in the case of interpretation of experimental results? Are 
people able to carefully evaluate the evidence presented or do they disregard or accept the 
evidence and jump right to the level of explanation (regardless of the quality of the 
evidence)? Klaczynski’s work on experiment evaluation has focused on belief-biased 
reasoning and cognitive development, and not on evidence vs. explanation-based 
reasoning per se. Therefore, the theory-evidence coordination model is ripe for 
application in this context. The issue of evidence vs. explanation-based reasoning is of 
central importance when considering how people interpret research findings on a day-to-
day basis. If people do not recognize the importance of evaluating research findings 
before jumping to level of theory-based explanations, they are in danger of engaging in 
the purely theory-based reasoning that characterizes Kuhn’s satisficing model. Those 
who are able first to evaluate research findings independently of their own theories and 
beliefs are truly engaging in the careful, critical reasoning that characterizes Kuhn’s 
theory-evidence coordination model.  
Sufficient evaluation of evidence is a crucial component of the theory-evidence 
coordination model because this model characterizes reasoners who select alternatives 
based on the consistency and quality of evidence that support them as opposed to 
alternatives that fit with their own prior beliefs and theories (and may or may not be 
supported by evidence) (Kuhn, 2001). These reasoners must be able evaluate the quality 
of different forms evidence as part of their broader reasoning and decision-making 
process.  
In additional to being primarily focused on creation of evidence or explanations in 
order to justify claims, Kuhn’s previous work on evidence vs. explanation-based 
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reasoning has been heavily focused on the domain of legal reasoning (Kuhn, 2001). Two 
studies here build on the research on evidence vs. explanation-based reasoning and apply 
the model of theory-evidence coordination as lens through which to examine the ways in 
which people interpret research findings in everyday contexts. As discussed above, 
people are exposed to research findings on a regular basis in popular media, and the way 
that they make sense of these research findings is not well understood. Therefore, the 
current project is designed to improve our understanding of how people interpret research 
findings and why using Kuhn’s model of theory-evidence coordination. The studies 
described in this paper address the following broad questions: 
1. To what extent are Kuhn’s findings on evidence-based vs. explanation-based 
reasoning applicable to people’s interpretation of research findings? 
2. To what extent is higher educational training, especially training in statistical and 
methodological reasoning, associated with sophisticated reasoning about research 
findings?  
3. To what extent are epistemic beliefs and thinking dispositions involved in 
scientific reasoning about research findings? 
The results of my two studies suggest that some people tend to focus more on the 
evaluation of evidence presented to them while others accept the evidence at face value 
and jump right to the level of explanation, attempting to make sense of the research 
findings in terms of what they already know (prior theories and beliefs), even when flaws 
are deliberately built into the evidence. My results also indicate positive relationships 
between evidence-based reasoning and higher educational experience, as well as 
epistemic beliefs, thinking dispositions and general intelligence.  
                                                                      






Chapter 2  
Study 1 
Introduction 
The goal of study 1 is to apply Kuhn’s model of theory-evidence coordination to 
students’ interpretation of graphs and vignettes describing research findings. Study 1 also 
addresses the relationship between higher education training and evidence-based 
reasoning. Previous studies have examined the effects of higher educational training on 
various aspects of critical thinking and scientific reasoning such as belief-bias avoidance, 
development of epistemic beliefs and statistical and methodological reasoning (e.g. 
Brem& Rips, 2000). Additionally, numerous researchers have studied the development of 
epistemic beliefs in college and graduate students (Jehng et al., 1993; King & Kitchener, 
2002). In their cross-sectional and longitudinal studies with studies with graduate 
students (1988), Lehman and Nisbett found that graduate training in psychology and 
medicine positively affected statistical and methodological reasoning skills.  
However, to my knowledge, no one has studied college and graduate students’ 
open-ended interpretations of research findings using a model of evidence vs. 
explanation-based reasoning. In my task, participants are not given much guidance about 
how to respond to the research findings, and therefore I capture their first responses to the 
vignettes describing experimental results. These responses can take various forms, and, 
therefore, the data are potentially rich and informative, but also challenging to interpret. 
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Using Kuhn’s research on evidence vs. explanation-based reasoning, I am able to make 
sense of this rich, authentic data. This task and method is unique in that it allows me to 
study the process by which students’ reason about the kinds of data they encounter 
everyday, not merely a targeted output.  
In order to do this, I created a coding scheme informed by Kuhn’s evidence vs. 
explanation-based reasoning model that I used to code Introductory Psychology students’ 
as well as graduate students’ open-ended responses to graphically presented research 
findings. This coding scheme allowed me to determine whether students’ responses were 
evidence or explanation-based (i.e. whether they were focused on the data presented to 
them or whether they accepted the data at face value and jumped right to the level of 
explanation). Those identified as engaging in evidence-based reasoning provided 
interpretations focused on the research findings themselves, providing comments on or 
criticism of the way the research was conducted, the nature of the data collected and/or 
the conclusions drawn by the researchers. Those identified as engaging in explanation-
based reasoning provided interpretations focused on relating the research findings to their 
own theories, beliefs and/or experiences.    
By using cross-sectional methods similar to those used in the Lehman, Lempert & 
Nisbett (1988), I tested early-stage undergraduates and graduate students from three 
different disciplines, with different amounts and types of scientific training.  This design 
allows me to address the question of whether higher education is associated with a shift 
from explanation/theory-based to evidence-based reasoning. I selected graduate students 
from disciplines I believed provide different types of training that might affect their 
ability to reason about research findings.  
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Firstly, Lehman, Lempert & Nisbett’s 1988 study with graduate students showed 
that psychology graduate students have more sophisticated statistical and methodological 
reasoning skills.  Additionally, the vignettes/graphs that I used in my tasks described 
different types of behavior research using methodologies that would be particularly 
familiar to trained psychologists. Therefore, I recruited two groups of psychology 
graduate students (social psychology and cognitive psychology) to participate in this 
study. I predicted that, because of their knowledge of statistics and research 
methodology, they would provide the most sophisticated descriptions of the patterns of 
results when compared with other participants. 
Deanna Kuhn has conducted research showing that historians coordinate theory 
and evidence when they engage in historical reasoning (Kuhn, Weinstock & Flaton, 
1994a). They are trained to look for specific points of evidence to support their theories, 
and, in this way, they are similar to other social scientists. A group of history graduate 
students was recruited for this study, and, informed by this research, I predicted that the 
history graduate student’s would engage in evidence-based reasoning. However, due to 
their lack of statistical and methodological training as compared to psychology graduate 
students, I predicted that the history graduate students would provide descriptions or 
evaluations of the data not as well-informed by statistical and methodological knowledge 
as those of psychology graduate students.  
An additional comparison group of graduate students was recruited (mechanical 
engineers) as well as a large group of mostly early-stage undergraduate students. 
Previous research has shown that advance higher educational training is associated with 
sophisticated epistemic beliefs (Jehng et al., 1993; King & Kitchener, 2002) as well as 
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strong critical thinking (Toplak & Stanovich, 2003) Therefore, I predicted that all four 
groups of graduate students would engage in more evidence-based reasoning that 
undergraduates in this study based on the fact that they had accumulated more 
educational training.  
I also manipulated the content of the vignettes/graphs to test for effects of content 
familiarity on people’s evidence vs. explanation-based reasoning. Half of the vignettes 
used in this study focused on general knowledge content (e.g. car accidents), whereas the 
other half focused on content primarily familiar to cognitive psychology graduate 
students (e.g. reaction time). This way, I was able to determine whether familiarity of 
content had an effect on people’s reasoning about research findings. 
Methodology 
Forty-eight undergraduate students from the University of Michigan were 
recruited through their Introductory Psychology course. They received course credit or 
payment of $15 for their participation. Graduate students in cognitive psychology (n=9), 
social psychology (n=6), history (n=8) and mechanical engineering (n=10) were recruited 
via an e-mail sent to every graduate student their departments. They received $10 in 
exchange for their participation in the study.  
Each participant received an identical packet including 16 vignettes of 
hypothetical scientific studies with corresponding graphs of the study’s results.  These 
vignettes included eight that described studies requiring some knowledge of cognitive 
psychology such as long-term memory as measured by the digit span task (see below).  
                                                                      





The other eight vignettes/graphs described studies on general knowledge topics such as 
sleep (see above). See Appendix A for the full 16 vignettes.  
  Each vignette was followed only by the request to “discuss the study.” Only one 
vignette and its corresponding graph was presented per page, each printed small enough 
that participants had plenty of room to write a response of up to a paragraph in length. 
Undergraduate students had only an hour to complete their packets in a laboratory setting, 
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whereas graduate students were able to take the packet home to complete it in their free 
time. 
We coded the participants’ responses to the 16 graphs by categorizing statements 
in terms of how the participants described the data and the kinds of commentary they 
made about the data, the study or its results.  The first dimension captured the 
participants’ description of what they read and saw and the second dimension captured 
their criticisms or explanations of the studies and data presented in the vignettes. Two 
coders worked independently to code participants’ responses. Cohen’s kappa reliability 
tests were conducted on 20% of the coded data, and inter-rater reliability was .75. The 
coding scheme that I used is presented below: 
Dimension 1. Sophisticated Descriptions of Data. Participants were given a “1” in this 
category if they provided a description of quantitative relationships between the 
variables. These descriptions included quantitative terminology such as “linear”, 
“exponential”, “more and more”, “gradual”, “slight”, “inverted U”, “steady 
increase/decrease”, “sharpest increase/decrease”, “varying rates”, “consistent” or “levels 
off” or they included percentages or gave a description of the graph shape in a way that 
allowed the reader to visualize the graph at least approximately without looking at it. 
Dimension 2. Explanation and Criticism of the Study and/or its Data. This dimension of 
my coding scheme categorized the types of commentary participants included in their 
responses. For each category within the axis, participants received a “0” if they did not 
include the category of commentary in their response and a “1” if they did include that 
category of commentary in their response. Participant explanation and criticism was split 
into the following categories:  
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A. No explanation or criticism- The participant failed to critique or provide 
comment on the study or results, i.e. no part of his/her statement fell under any of 
the categories that follow. If participants received a “1” in this category, they 
automatically received a “0” in the other interpretation categories.  
B. Explanation- The participant identified an causal mechanism that he/she 
believed explained the pattern of results presented in the graph. 
E.g. “It makes sense that digit span should increase with age because 
people have had a longer time to practice working-memory tasks in their 
daily life compared to younger children who have had less need for these 
abilities.” 
C. Evaluation- A participant  
a) included comments or criticism of the experimental design 
 E.g.  “This study should have been done longitudinally to account for the 
possibility that there is a generational difference due purely to cultural 
differences”, “This experiment is flawed because it doesn’t include 
individuals from all parts of the country or account for the difference 
relative value of a dollar in different areas” 
b)   made an evaluation of results by indicating that the results fit with prior 
knowledge, that they don’t trust the results or by criticizing the results based on 
some prior knowledge. 
 E.g.  “That seems about right. It makes sense that older people would be 
worse drivers”, “There’s no way this is right.  I am almost certain that 
baby’s [sic]can’t talk this soon.” 
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c)   asked questions by asking for further info, asking how the results could be 
explained, asking if a construct is an important one, or asking questions/making 
comments about statistical analysis leading to the results. 
 E.g. “Can a two year-old really do that?”, “How can you explain 
something like that?”, “Were the data split into separate groups before 
running analysis? What kind of comparison was done exactly?” 
Results  
For a full table of descriptive statistics from this study, see Table 1. In accordance 
with predictions, psychology graduate students provided the most sophisticated, 
quantitative description of the research findings, with undergraduates and history 
graduate students providing the least sophisticated descriptions (see Figure 1). For 
example, one social psychology graduate student provided a clear, quantitative 
description of a study about the relationship between vocabulary size and age: “Appears 
to be a linear relationship—increased age=increased vocabulary, although it plateaus, so 
resembles a power function more closely—highly accelerated vocabulary expansion at 
first, then slows down towards older age.”  In contrast, an undergraduate student provided 
a much less sophisticated description of a study about the relationship between age and 
hours slept per night and age that doesn’t give a clear picture of the research finding: 
“From the age of 20, most people get less sleep.” Indeed, results from a one-way 
ANOVA indicated significant group differences on the description variable F(4, 
76)=4.42, p<.01, hp2=.189.  
Additionally, graduate students provided more evaluations of the data than did 
undergraduate students, with history and mechanical engineering graduate students 
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providing the most evaluation (see Figure 2). For example, one history student questioned 
the definition of long-term memory as well as the effect size in a study examining the 
relationship between age and long-term memory for lists: “Isn’t remembering lists short-
term memory? Can 1 week classify as long-term? Once again, the drop in # of words-8 to 
5-doesn’t seem terribly significant.”  This type of criticism, especially of definition and 
operationalization of variables, was typical of history students. Again, results from a one-
way ANOVA indicated that these group differences on the evaluation variable were 
significant: F(4, 76)=3.89, p<.01, hp2=.170.  
Undergraduates provided significantly more explanations of the data than did 
graduate students (F(4, 76)=2.82, p<.05, hp2=.129; see Figure 3). Examples such as the 
following explanation of the results of the age-vocabulary size study were typical of 
undergraduate responses: “As you get older you are exposed to more vocabulary because 
of surroundings. When you are younger you are exposed to different environments are 
less knowledgeable.” Graduate students were much less likely to provide explanations of 
the research findings as part of their interpretations.  
We also conducted an analysis comparing people’s performance on the cognitive 
psych vs. general knowledge vignettes (see Figures 4, 5, & 6 for graphs of these results). 
For the undergraduate group, the graph content made a difference on all three dimensions 
of the coding scheme. Undergraduates provided significantly more sophisticated 
descriptions of the cognitive psych content vignettes as compared to the general 
knowledge vignettes (F(1, 45)=18.18, p<.001, hp2=.288.  Undergraduates also provided 
significantly more evaluations of the cognitive psych content vignettes (F(1, 45)=4.62, 
p<.05, hp2=.093). However, the undergraduates provided significantly more explanations 
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of the general knowledge vignettes (F(1, 45)=16.43, p<.001, hp2=.267). For example, the 
following are the same undergraduate students’ responses to a cognitive psych vignette 
and a general knowledge vignette. The cognitive psych vignette dealt with the 
relationship between visual acuity and age: “OK! The graph is telling us that as you get 
older, your visual acuity reduces.” The student simply provides a description of the 
research findings from this vignette. On the other hand, in response to a vignette dealing 
with the relationship between net worth and age the student wrote: “Well, hopefully this 
makes sense because if you have more than $20,000 in your account saved up by 20, you 
must really have been thinking ahead.” In this response, the participant relates the 
research findings to his/her own beliefs and experience. 
There were no significant differences in the way that cognitive psychology graduate 
students interpreted the cognitive psych vs. general knowledge graphs. In other words, 
cognitive psychology students’ responses to cognitive psychology studies and non-
cognitive psychology studies were surprisingly similar. For example, a cognitive 
psychology graduate student’s response to the study about long-term memory for words 
was: “Memory for words declines in a nearly linear (constant rate) pattern, except for a 
sharper drop between 50 & 55.” This same student’s response to the study about number 
of hours slept per night: “Number of hours slept per night declines nearly linearly with 
age. At a rate of about ¼ hour loss for every 5 years.” Other graduate students’ provided 
more descriptions of cognitive psych as compared to general knowledge graphs(F(1, 
25)=8.40, p<.01, hp2=.252), but there were no differences in the number of evaluations 
and explanations that they provided.  
                                                                      




Psychology graduates students who we can assume had the greatest comfort with 
interpreting behavioral research results, provided the most sophisticated descriptions of 
the data. This finding is consistent with Lehman et al.’s 1998 finding that psychology 
graduate students possess advanced statistical and methodological reasoning skills. It is 
possible that both groups of psychology students in my study used their statistical and 
methodological reasoning skills to make sense of the data provided to them and to 
describe them in way that took into account quantitative relationships between variables. 
Perhaps it was their statistical and methodological skills that allowed the psychology 
graduate students to provide complex descriptions of the research findings and graphs in 
a way that the other groups were not able to do. It is also possible that, because 
psychology students were familiar with the types of behavioral data presented in the 
vignettes, they were more accepting of these data, and, therefore, tended to describe it 
instead of evaluating it. The other groups of graduate students, while they did not provide 
many complex descriptions of the data, still did provide evidence-based responses to the 
vignettes in the form of evaluations.  
Mechanical engineering and history graduate students in my study were consistently 
critical of the experimental results, questioning everything from the operationalization of 
variables to the procedure used to gather data, whereas undergraduates in my study 
tended to accept the validity of the results and jump right to the level of explanation. 
Interpreted through the lens of Kuhn’s research on evidence vs. explanation-based 
reasoning, these results indicate that graduate students were more likely than 
undergraduates to provide evidence-based discussions of research findings. This result 
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must be interpreted carefully because of the different amounts of time that the two groups 
(undergraduates and graduate students) were given to complete the tasks. However, this 
result is consistent with previous research showing that higher levels of education are 
associated with greater attention to evidence as opposed to explanation (Brem& Rips, 
2000, Kuhn, 2001). It is also consistent with findings that higher levels of education are 
associated with critical thinking dispositions and skills more generally (Jehng et al., 1993; 
King & Kitchener, 2002; Toplak & Stanovich, 2003).  
 Undergraduates more than any other group were affected by the content of the 
vignettes that they were interpreting. They provided fewer explanations and more 
descriptions and evaluations of the cognitive psych vignettes as compared to the general 
knowledge vignettes. Likely this is because they did not have any prior knowledge 
relating to the content of the cognitive psych vignettes and, therefore, were not able to 
provide explanations for these research findings. It’s interesting that the other graduate 
students groups were not as affected by the vignette contents, providing similar 
interpretations of the cognitive psych vs. general knowledge vignettes (with the exception 
of the number of descriptions provided by the non-cognitive psych graduate students). 
Perhaps increased higher educational experience makes one less vulnerable to content 
effects on evidence-based reasoning. This could be because, as part of their higher 
educational training, students are often asked to review and interpret evidence in one 
form or another. The number of explanations (as compared to data-driven responses) 
provided by graduate students was low regardless of the content of the vignettes.  
 In summary, the results from study 1 demonstrate that higher education is 
associated with a greater emphasis on evaluation of data as well as more sophisticated 
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descriptions of quantitative information.  The goal of study 2 was to examine how 
individual differences in epistemic beliefs, thinking dispositions and general intelligence 
may influence individuals’ interpretations of data and explain education differences. In 
study 1, flaws identified by participants were not systematically built into the 
vignettes/graphs, so I was not able to include a measure of flaw recognition. In study 2 I 
built systematic flaws into the vignette measure that I used, and coded for whether 








                                                                      







For study 2, I collected data on a new measure of everyday scientific reasoning 
that requires participants to comment on vignettes describing research findings. These 
vignettes had a number of qualities that the graphs and vignettes from the first study did 
not have. Firstly, I wanted to give subjects a task that is as close to a ‘real world’ 
evidence interpretation task as possible, in order gauge how they might behave in an 
everyday scientific reasoning context such as reading and interpreting a newspaper 
article. Therefore, for this study I decided to base most of my vignettes on newspaper 
articles from popular publications like the New York Times and the San Francisco 
Chronicle. I identified newspaper articles that described research findings, and adapted 
the descriptions from these articles to suit my purposes. I focused the vignettes on general 
knowledge topics that would be familiar to most if not all subjects such as obesity and 
video games. I wanted people to have experience with the issues raised in the vignettes, 
so that they had the potential to relate the research findings to their prior knowledge and 
beliefs.  
Secondly, I wanted to address the question of whether students would be more 
likely to attend to evidence if the quality of the evidence was notably lower than in 
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vignettes to include systematic methodological flaws such as sampling bias and 
correlation-causation confusion (see description of task below for further details). These 
flaws served to highlight the need for critical evidence evaluation in my task. I selected 
them based on three main factors. Firstly, these flaws often are likely to appear in 
newspaper articles I encountered; therefore, they seem to be numerous in the ‘real world’ 
context I was interested in reproducing. Secondly, literature on the teaching of statistics 
and research methods indicates that people seem to struggle with reasoning about many 
of these issues (Hatfield & Faunce, 2006; Leshowitz, 1989). Finally, participants in study 
1 commented on these types of flaws in their discussions of the vignettes/graphs. This 
was particularly true of the issue of operationalization of variables. 
Finally, I provided participants with two sets of instructions for interpreting the 
vignettes that I created. At first, participants were presented with the eight vignettes and 
were told simple to “discuss the studies.” Then they were presented with the eight 
vignettes again and were asked to “critically evaluate the studies.” I included these two 
sets of instructions in order to distinguish between what people were disposed to do and 
what they were able to do. This design allowed me to determine both whether people’s 
initial, spontaneous reactions to the vignettes were evidence or explanation-based as well 
as whether they were able to shift to evidence-based responses when explicitly told to do 
so.  
Study 1 examined how people trained in different fields of graduate study (and 
early-stage undergraduates) engage in everyday scientific reasoning about research 
findings. It provided a rich picture of the processes that less and more advanced students 
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use to interpret research findings, with the major finding being that graduate students’ 
interpretations are more data-driven than undergraduates’. However, while the findings of 
study 1 do indicate that there are educationally-driven differences in evidence 
interpretation, I do not know why this is. In other words, what individual difference 
factors underlie the reasoning of less and more advanced students? Are beliefs about 
knowledge (epistemic beliefs) and thinking dispositions an underlying factor driving 
evidence vs. explanation-based reasoning in this context, as Deanna Kuhn  and others’ 
work suggests? Are other factors such as statistical and methodological reasoning 
important as well when one is interpreting research findings?  
As part of her work on scientific reasoning and critical thinking, Deanna Kuhn 
and others have shown that people with more sophisticated epistemic beliefs perform 
better on tasks requiring coordination of theory and evidence (Kuhn, 2001). Additionally, 
other research has demonstrated a positive relationship between thinking dispositions 
(e.g. actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition) and critical thinking 
constructs such as belief-bias avoidance (Stanovich& West, 1997). However, there is a 
dearth of research examining the relationships between epistemic beliefs and thinking 
dispositions and evidence-based interpretation of research findings. The following studies 
allowed me to address these issues, and should help me to identify underlying factors 
mediating the relationship between higher educational training and evidence 
interpretation. Specifically, I predicted that sophisticated epistemic beliefs and thinking 
dispositions would be positively associated with evidence-based reasoning about research 
findings. Additionally, I predicted that those who engage in evidence-based reasoning 
would be more likely to recognize the flaws in the vignettes. I also predicted that 
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recognition of the flaws in the vignettes would depend on the amount of statistical and 
methodological training people had received.  
In study 2, I tested an entirely undergraduate population.  My participants were 
undergraduate students at less and more advanced stages of their undergraduate careers. 
This design allowed me to determine whether the differences I observed in the evidence 
interpretation processes of early undergraduate and graduate students were also 
observable in an entirely undergraduate population. Based on the results of study 1, as 
well as previous research on undergraduate training and reasoning (Kuhn, 2001; Lehman 
&Nisbett, 1990; Toplak & Stanovich, 2003), I predicted that undergraduate training 
would be positively associated with evidence-based reasoning. Therefore, I predicted that 
more advanced undergraduate students would provide more evidence-based 
interpretations of research findings. I also predicted that that those with training in 
statistics and research methodology (psychology majors) would be most likely to 
recognize the statistical and methodological flaws in the vignettes.  
As in study 1, my unique open-ended data collection and coding allowed me to 
examine the processes by which students interpreted research findings. Additionally, the 
methodological flaws in my experiment vignettes allowed me to determine whether 
evidence-based interpretations of research findings were associated with identification of 
problems with these research findings. Finally, the additional measures of statistical and 
methodological training, and epistemic belief and thinking dispositions allowed me a 
better understanding of what factors underlay the processes that students’ used to 
interpret research findings.  
 
                                                                      




I first conducted a pilot study, and gave 40 Introductory Psychology students the 
newly adapted vignettes as well as measures of thinking dispositions (actively open-
minded thinking and need for cognition). Findings indicated a positive relationship 
between evidence-based interpretations of the research findings in the vignettes and 
actively open-minded thinking. Based on the results of the pilot study, I developed a 
study, which, in addition to the vignettes and dispositional measures, also included 
measures of epistemic beliefs, and amount of statistical and methodological training. I 
decided to include a measure of epistemic beliefs in addition to my dispositional 
measures because Kuhn makes the argument that people’s epistemic beliefs shape 
intellectual values and hence the disposition to utilize intellectual skills (Kuhn, 2001). 
Thinking dispositions act to link epistemic beliefs and abilities in the context of critical 
thinking. By including an epistemic belief measure in this study, I was able to measure all 
of these interrelated constructs. For this study I recruited an additional group of 
Introductory Psychology students as well as advanced psychology, history and 
engineering students. This allowed me to examine potential educational differences in 
interpretation of vignettes, similar to the ones observed in study 1.   
Participants were from the Introductory Psychology subject pool at the University 
of Michigan. I collected data on 40 participants, asking them about their majors, the 
science coursework they had taken and whether they considered themselves to be “good 
scientific reasoners.” All participants completed the following measures on the 
SurveyMonkey.com website. All participants provided open-ended discussions of 8 
vignettes describing research findings in response to two sequential prompts. At the first 
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prompt, participants were simply asked to “discuss the 8 studies.” At the second, they 
were asked to “critically evaluate these studies: the way they were conducted, their 
findings and/or their conclusions.” All participants received both prompts in the same 
order. The majority of the vignettes were based on descriptions of experimental results 
from newspaper articles from the New York Times and the San Francisco Chronicle. 
Additionally, I systematically included a methodological flaw in each of the vignettes. 
The four types of flaws I included were: unclear operationalization of variables, over-
interpretation of small effect sizes, biased samples and misinterpretation of correlational 
data (i.e. correlation/causation confusion). Each of the four flaws was included in two of 
the vignettes. The following vignette contains one of the operationalization flaws. In this 
vignette, what is meant by “creative accomplishments” is not defined. 
A researcher interested in how creativity in scientific reasoning changes with age 
conducted a study. He asked colleagues of hundreds of randomly chosen scientists 
from across the United States to rank the mean number of creative scientific 
accomplishments that their colleagues had made over the past year. He calculated 
with average number of creative accomplishments as a function of age, and found 
that number of creative accomplishments increased from age 20-35 and then 
began to decline.  
 
This next vignette contains an effect size flaw. The small effect size (3 points difference) 
is over-interpreted as a momentous and important finding. 
The eldest children in families tend to develop higher I.Q.s than their siblings, 
researchers are reporting today, in a large study (two papers) that could settle 
more than a half-century of scientific debate about the relationship between I.Q. 
and birth order. The average difference in I.Q. was three points higher in the 
eldest child than in the closest sibling. ''I consider these two papers the most 
important publications to come out in this field in 70 years; it's a dream come 
true,'' said Frank J. Sulloway, a psychologist at the Institute of Personality and 
Social Research at the University of California, Berkeley. 
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This third example contains one of the sampling bias flaws. People asked about interest 
in politics in the study were already participating in political events, and were therefore 
not a representative sample of the population of Americans. 
A recent study shows that Americans are more interested in politics than was 
previously thought. Researchers approached people at events such as town 
meetings and city council meetings and surveyed them about their interest in 
political and their voting behavior. Seventy percent of those surveyed reported 
that they were planning to vote in upcoming local and national elections. More 
than half said that they regularly read articles in the newspaper about political 
issues.   
This final example contains one of the correlation-causation flaws. In this example, the 
relationship between controlling mother and obese children is misinterpreted as a causal 
one.  
A study of 77 children aged 3 to 5 found that those with the most body fat had the 
most “controlling” mothers when it came to the amount of food eaten. “The more 
control the mother reported using over her child’s eating, the less self-regulation 
the child displayed,” Dr. Johnson and her co-author said.  
 
For the full set of 8 vignettes used in the pilot study, see Appendix B. 
The Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale is a thinking dispositional 
questionnaire designed to measure people’s ability to engage in actively open-minded 
thinking (Stanovich& West, 1997; Sá, Kelley, Ho, &Stanovich, 2005).The actively open-
minded thinking scale was composed for 41 items taken from different sources:10 items 
from a flexible thinking scale developed by Stanovich and West(1997); 8 items from the 
Openness-Values facet of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 
1992); 9 items measuring dogmatism (Paulhus & Reid, 1991; Robinson, Shaver, 
&Wrightsman,1991; Troldahl & Powell, 1965); 3 items from the categorical thinking 
subscale of Epstein and Meier’s (1989) constructive thinking inventory;9 items from the 
belief identification scale developed by Sa et al. (1999);2 items from a counterfactual 
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thinking scale developed by Stanovich and West (1997). The response format is a 6-point 
Likert scale (6—agree strongly, 1--disagree strongly). Sample items include: “A person 
should always consider new possibilities,” and “There are two kinds of people in this 
world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth” (Reflected). See 
Appendix D for the full Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale. 
We also included the Need for Cognition scale, another dispositional scale 
measuring the motivation to engage in challenging cognitive activities (Caccioppo & 
Petty, 1982). Participants were asked whether a series of statements are characteristic of 
them. The response format was a 5-point Likert scale (5---extremely characteristic, 1---
extremely uncharacteristic). Sample items include: “I find satisfaction in deliberating 
hard and for long hours,” and  “I only think as hard as I have to” (Reflected). See 
Appendix E for the full Need for Cognition scale. For both the AOT and NFC 
questionnaires, responses on reverse items were reversed and responses were summed to 
create one composite score for each participant.    
We adapted the coding scheme used in study 1 to address the specific question of 
whether participants recognized methodological flaws in the vignettes. Additionally I 
coded whether the participants evaluated or critiqued the data and/or whether they 
provided an explanation for the pattern of results. I considered evaluations of the data to 
be evidence-based reasoning and explanations of the data to be explanation-based 
reasoning. This adapted coding scheme did not focus on participants’ description of the 
results because the results were already described in the vignettes (and are not 
accompanied by a graphical representation). Therefore, I determined that it was unlikely 
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that participants would spend much time on description. The coding scheme that I used is 
presented below. 
1. Explanation and Evaluation. This section of my coding scheme categorized the types 
of commentary participants included in their responses. For each category within the axis, 
participants received a “0” if they did not include the category of commentary in their 
response and a “1” if they did include that category of commentary in their response. This 
section is was divided into the following categories: 
A. No explanation or criticism- The participant failed to critique or provide 
comment on the study or results, i.e. no part of his/her statement fell under 
any of the categories that follow. If participants received a “1” in this 
category, they automatically received a “0” in the other interpretation 
categories.  
B. Evaluation/Criticism of Methodology- The participant 
a. Questioned the definition or operationalization of a concept or 
category like creativity (e.g. general health too broad of a category) 
b. Questioned the survey materials, scales used, experimental materials- 
(e.g. # of word lists) 
c. Questioned the experimental design/procedure 
e.g. Number of ss, design (longitudinal), sample –random?, age 
range etc. 
e.g. How was x calculated? 
e.g. How was data collected? 
e.g. Statistical criticisms 
                                                                      
      
 36 
 
d. Questioned the interpretation of the results 
e.g. The authors interpret the results as a causal effect (when it is 
really just correlational). 
e.g. They authors over-interpret an effect (i.e. a small effect is 
blown out of proportion) 
e.g. Contradiction of author’s interpretation of results (i.e. maybe 
this could be interpreted differently….) 
C. Recognition of major flaw- The participant recognized the major flaw (listed 
below). 
a. Vignette 1(obese children with controlling mothers): It is a 
correlational study>>>>you cannot derive causation (i.e. just because 
obese children have more controlling mothers, doesn’t mean that the 
mother over-control CAUSED them to be obese. The mother could 
also be controlling BECAUSE the children are obese). 
b. Vignette 2(creativity): There is NO operational definition of 
creativity (i.e. how are the scientists supposed to know what he/she 
means by “creative accomplishments” when they rank their 
colleagues?) 
c. Vignette 3 (abuse): There is NO operational definition of abuse (what 
do they mean when they say the have been “abused”?) 
d. Vignette 4 (runners): It is a correlational study>>>>you cannot 
derive causation (i.e. just because these people run, it doesn’t mean 
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that their running CAUSED them to be physically fit. It could be diet 
or other factors).  
e. Vignette 5 (IQ): This is a very small effect size. (i.e. There is only 3 
points of difference on the IQ test, but they make it sound like a much 
bigger finding than it actually is). 
f. Vignette 6 (Video games): This is an issue of sampling bias. (i.e. The 
kids tested are all the children of university professors; therefore, they 
are not a random sample of the population). 
g. Vignette 7 (Preschool): This is a very small effect size. (i.e. There is 
only a 1 percent difference on the test, but they are making it sound 
like a much bigger finding than it actually is). 
h. Vignette 8 (Political participation): This is an issue of sampling bias. 
(i.e. The people surveyed are already at political events; therefore, they 
are not a random sample of the population). 
D. Explanation- The participant identified a causal mechanism that he/she 
believed explained the pattern of results presented in the vignettes based on 
own his/her beliefs, theories, and experiences.  
 Descriptive statistics for the Need for Cognition Scale, the Actively Open-Minded 
Thinking Questionnaire and the vignette coding are presented in Table 2. One can see 
from this that people were more likely to explain the research findings (for an average of 
over 5.5 out of 8 vignettes) than they were to evaluate them (for an average of 3 out of 8 
vignettes). Additionally, people only recognized the major flaw for an average of 1.5 out 
of 8 vignettes. When participants were told directly to critically evaluate the studies, the 
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average number of studies evaluated jumped to 4 and the number of flaw recognized 
jumped to 2; however, people still provided explanations for approximately 6 vignettes. 
Analyses conducted on 40 participants’ data revealed a significant positive 
correlation between scores on actively open-minded thinking and number of vignettes 
that were evaluated r=.383, p<.05 as well as the number of times participants recognized 
the major flaw r=.526, p<.01. Not surprisingly, evaluation of the vignettes and 
recognition of the major flaw were strongly positively correlated r=.755, p<.01. The 
Need for Cognition scale was not significantly correlated with any of the other measures.  
 Interestingly, evaluation of the vignettes was positively correlated with 
explanation of the vignettes r=.488, p<.01, suggesting that some people both evaluated 
and explained the research findings. Additionally, the number of explanations provided 
was positively correlated with the Actively Open-Minded Thinking questionnaire, 
although this correlation did not reach significance r=.294, p>.05).  
 These results indicated that people’s responses to the vignettes were successfully 
coded into evidence and explanation-based categories, with this group tending to provide 
more explanations than evaluations of the research findings. The number of flaws 
recognized by the participants was relatively low (1.5 out of 8), and I altered the vignettes 
before conducting study 2 to make the flaws more conspicuous.  The positive correlation 
between actively open-minded thinking and the number of evaluations provided and flaw 
recognized was predicted; however, the positive correlation between actively open-
minded thinking and the number of explanations provided was surprising. Additionally, I 
was surprised to find that need for cognition was not significantly correlated with any of 
the vignette measures. These issues were explored further in study 2.  
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Study 2 Methodology 
Study 2 allowed me to examine the relationship between evidence vs. 
explanation-based interpretation of experimental results, epistemic beliefs and thinking 
dispositions, statistical and methodological training and higher education. In this study, I 
included all measures from the pilot study in addition to a measure of epistemic beliefs 
(before I only measured dispositions). I decided to include a measure of epistemic beliefs 
in addition to my dispositional measures because Kuhn makes the argument that people’s 
epistemic beliefs shape intellectual values and hence the disposition to utilize intellectual 
skills (Kuhn, 2001). For example, if one believes that there can be multiple valid theories 
that must be compared with one another, one will be disposed to use one’s intellectual 
skills to seek out and evaluate evidence related to these theories. Thinking dispositions 
act to link epistemic beliefs and abilities in the context of critical thinking. By including 
an epistemic belief measure in this study, I was able to measure all of these interrelated 
constructs. Additionally, I tested both Introductory Psychology students and 
undergraduate students trained in psychology, history and engineering. 
Study 2 involved freshman participants from the Introductory Psychology subject 
pool at the University of Michigan as well as more advanced (sophomore, junior and 
senior) undergraduate students in the University of Michigan departments of Psychology, 
Engineering and History. Frequencies broken down by year in college and major are 
presented in Table 3. This mirrors the cross-sectional design used in study 1 with 
advanced undergraduates instead of graduate students.  
Based on the small number of flaws recognized in the pilot study (1.5 out of 8), I 
changed the wording of the vignettes to make the flaws even more apparent. Below is an 
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example of a vignette from the pilot study, and then again in its revised version as it was 
used in study 2. 
A study of 77 children aged 3 to 5 found that those with the most body fat had the 
most “controlling” mothers when it came to the amount of food eaten. “The more 
control the mother reported using over her child’s eating, the less self-regulation 
the child displayed,” Dr. Johnson and her co-author said.  
 
As part of a recent study, researchers measured children's body fat and surveyed 
mothers about the amount of control they exert over their children's eating. The 
results of this study, conducted with 77 children aged 3 to 5, found that those with 
the most body fat had the most “controlling” mothers when it came to the amount 
of food eaten. This shows that when mothers exert more control over their 
children's eating, the children display less self-control, researchers said. 
 
The final line in the second version of the vignette was changed so that it would 
emphasize that the correlational relationship in this study was incorrectly interpreted as a 
causal relationship. Additionally, the name “Dr. Johnson” was removed from the vignette 
to avoid potential effect of this source information on people’s interpretation of the study 
(Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002). 
 As in the pilot study, participants completed all measures on the Survey Monkey 
website, beginning with the vignettes (“discuss studies” condition followed by “critically 
evaluate” condition), followed by the epistemic belief and thinking disposition 
questionnaires and the background/follow-up questions. Additionally, to determine 
whether the web context had a significant effect on participants’ performance on the 
tasks, I also tested 15 participants in a lab setting. There were no significant differences 
between the performance of lab and non-lab participants on any of my measures (see 
Table 4 for non-significant ANOVA vignettes results); thus, I report data combined. The 
measures that were used in this study were the same as those described for the pilot 
study, with a few notable changes. Firstly, in addition to asking about college major and 
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coursework (including their statistics and research methods courses), I also asked 
students to report on their beliefs about the research topics discussed in the vignettes, 
their knowledge of the specific types of methodological flaws included in the vignettes, 
their interest in media outlets such as newspaper articles and their SAT or ACT scores 
(see Appendix G for full list of questions). Finally, I included a measure of epistemic 
beliefs in addition to my actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition measures. 
The measure I used to measure epistemic beliefs was the Epistemic Belief Inventory 
(EBI), developed by Schraw, Bendixen and Dunkle (2002). It consists of 28 items to 
which participants respond using a five-point Likert scale in which 1 corresponds to 
“strongly disagree” and 5 corresponds to “strongly agree.” Sample items include: “most 
things worth knowing are easy to understand” and “what is true is a matter of opinion.” 
The full scale is included in Appendix F. The coding scheme used to code the vignettes 
was the same as the one used in the pilot study. 
Results 
See Table 5 for a full table of descriptive statistics for all tasks used in study 2. 
Vignette data was coded for evidence-based (evaluations of the data) vs. explanation-
based (explanations of the data) reasoning as well as for recognition of the major flaws in 
the vignettes. Coding and analysis of vignette data indicated that my data did conform to 
an evaluation vs. explanation model of scientific reasoning. People’s responses fit easily 
into my evaluation and explanation coding categories and 20% inter-rater reliability was 
good (Cohen’s kappa=.7). 
When presented with my 8 vignettes (see Appendix B), and told simply to 
“Discuss the studies,” people provided evaluative statements for an average of 3.45 out of 
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8 vignettes (SD=2.35), explanatory statements for an average of 2.88 vignettes 
(SD=2.01), and they recognized the major flaw in an average of 1.6 vignettes (SD=1.47). 
See Figure 7 for a graph of these results. For example, one participant provided the 
following evaluative statement in response to the vignette describing the study on 
political interest: 
This research is clearly not very accurate as the people surveyed were already 
participating in politics. Of course they are going to have an interest in politics! 
To make this study more accurate, a random sample would have to be done at 
events that are not political in nature. 
 
In this example, one can see that this participant also recognized the major flaw in 
the vignette: sampling bias. Another participant provided the following explanatory 
statement in response to the vignette describing the study on controlling mothers and 
obese children: “Mothers think they can get their child to be skinnier by controlling them 
when really it just makes a child want to disobey them.” In this example, the participant 
accepted the research findings and immediately attempted to explain them. As in the pilot 
study, when participants were specifically told to “critically evaluate the studies,” they 
were more likely to evaluate than when they were simply told to “discuss the studies” 
(M=5.17, SD=2.16). They were also slightly more likely to recognize the major flaw in 
the study under these circumstances (M=2.13, SD=1.48). However, interestingly, when 
told to critically evaluate the studies, people were also more like to explain the study 
(M=3.24, SD=2.37). 
When I examined vignettes with different types of flaws built into them, I 
discovered some interesting patterns. People were most likely to evaluate and recognize 
flaws in the vignettes with built in sampling bias errors. They were least likely to 
recognize flaws in the vignettes with built in over-interpretations of small effect sizes and 
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correlation-causation misinterpretation (see Figure 8). This is in line with previous 
research suggesting that people have particular difficulty distinguishing between 
correlation and causation (Hatfield and Faunce, 2006; Zimmerman, 2005). However, 
there is a dearth of research comparing people’s recognition of different types of 
statistical and methodological flaws, so it is difficult to interpret these differences. 
 At the end of the study, I asked people about their beliefs about and experiences 
with the topics presented in the vignettes. As would be expected, people tended to 
provide evaluations for a higher percentage of the vignettes with results that contradicted 
their prior beliefs and experiences (41%) than the vignettes with results that in line with 
their beliefs and experiences (28%). The same was true for recognition of flaws, with 
people recognizing flaws in 22% of the vignettes that contradicted their beliefs and 
experiences and 8% of the vignettes in line with their beliefs and experiences. This result 
fits with previous research showing that people are more critical of evidence that goes 
against their prior beliefs (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979).  
We conducted ANOVA analyses to determine whether there were group 
differences in interpretation of the vignettes, as well as in performance on my survey 
measures. I compared the performance of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior 
undergraduate students as well as the performance of advanced undergraduates with 
different types of educational training (psychology, history, engineering).  
An analysis of variance revealed a significant effect of year in college on 
students’ interpretation of the vignettes (see Figure 9; Table 6). In the ‘discuss this 
studies’ condition, there were significant differences in the number of evaluations 
provided by students in different years in college F(3, 264)=11.23, p<.001, hp2=.113, with 
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freshman providing the fewest evaluative statements and seniors providing the most. 
Recognition of major flaws in the vignettes exhibited the same significant pattern, with 
students with more education recognizing more and more flaws F(3, 264)=9.81, p<.001, 
hp2=.100.  The following example is a response provided by a junior mechanical 
engineering major when asked to “discuss” the vignette describing the creativity study: 
This study is very much based on speculation by those interviewed. Especially at 
question is the definition of the variable.  What constitutes a "creative scientific 
achievement;" a survey done by one, impartial scientist or panel would be more 
effective at accurately and unbiased study.  
 
The number of explanations showed the opposite pattern, with freshman and sophomores 
providing the most explanations and juniors and seniors providing the fewest, although 
this pattern was not significant F(3, 264)=1.47, p=.224, hp2=.016.  The following is the 
response of a freshman undeclared major when asked to “discuss” the study on creativity: 
This makes sense because the age of 20-35 range is a time where most adults 
prosper.  They are no longer kids and are able to make their own real 
accomplishments.  After 35 people tend to have a steady job and start families.  
The exciting, risk taking, accomplishing part of life slowly turns into a routine. 
 
This freshman student accepts the research findings described in the vignette and 
immediately attempts to make sense of them in terms of his/her prior knowledge and 
beliefs. 
When covariates were included in the models described above, this ANCOVA 
analysis showed a significant effect of dispositional and percentile measures as 
covariates. In the corrected model, there were still significant differences in the number 
of evaluations provided by students with different amounts of education (F(6, 252)=7.43, 
p<.001, hp2=.081), although this effect was lessened by the introduction of covariates. 
Score on the Need for Cognition questionnaire and percentile on the SAT/ACT also 
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significantly and marginally significant affected the number of evaluations provided in 
this condition (NFC: F(6, 252)=5.61, p<.05, hp2=.022; Percentile: F(6, 252)=3.51, 
p=.062, hp2=.014). There were also still significant differences in the number of times 
major flaws were recognized by students with different amounts of education (F(6, 
252)=6.00, p=.001, hp2=.067), although this effect was also lessened by the introduction 
of covariates. Score on the Actively Open-Minded Thinking questionnaire also 
significantly affected the number of flaws recognized (F(6, 252)=6.34, p<.05, hp2=.025). 
There were no significant covariate effects on the number of explanations people 
provided. 
An analysis of variance revealed a significant effect of major on students’ 
responses to the vignettes (see Figure 10; Table 7). In the ‘discuss the studies’ condition, 
there were significant differences in the number of evaluations provided by students with 
different majors F(4, 263)=7.70, p<.001, hp2=.105, with history majors providing the 
most evaluative statements, followed by engineering majors. Psychology and undeclared 
majors provided the fewest evaluative statements. For example, one history major’s 
response to the research finding that children enjoy educational video games as much as 
they enjoy non-educational video games was:  
Interesting data, but I am inclined to argue that the study doesn't necessarily 
indicate anything about children as a whole.  A fuller study of children of every 
social or economic class would be needed before they can claim that all children 
enjoy educational and non-educational games alike. 
 
This student not only evaluates the methodology of the study described, but recognized 
the major flaw in the vignette (sampling bias). Recognition of major flaws in the 
vignettes exhibited the same significant pattern (F(4, 263)=3.76, p<.01, hp2=.054), with 
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history and engineering majors recognizing the most flaws. The number of explanations 
did not display a significant effect of major.   
Similar patterns of group differences emerged for my surveys, measuring thinking 
dispositions and beliefs (see Tables 8 and 9) as well as self-reported interest in and 
knowledge of scientific content and methodology (see Tables 10 and 11), with seniors 
exhibiting the most sophisticated thinking beliefs and dispositions as well as the strongest 
interest in and knowledge of scientific content followed by juniors, sophomores and 
freshman (see Table 12). Interestingly, engineering majors had the highest need for 
cognition scores, followed closely by the history majors. History majors had by far the 
highest actively open-minded thinking questionnaire scores, followed by the engineering 
majors (see Table 9). This is interesting considering that history and engineering majors 
also provided the most evidence-based responses to the research findings and recognized 
the most flaws in the vignettes.  
When covariates were included in the models described above, this ANCOVA 
analysis showed a significant effect of dispositional and percentile measures as 
covariates. In the corrected model, there were still significant differences in the number 
of evaluations provided by students with different majors (F(7, 251)=5.22, p<.001, 
hp2=.077), although this effect was lessened by the introduction of covariates. Score on 
the Need for Cognition questionnaire and percentile on the SAT/ACT also significantly 
and marginally significant affected the number of evaluations provided in this condition 
(NFC: F(7, 251)=5.40, p<.05, hp2=.021; Percentile: F(7, 251)=3.35, p=.068, hp2=.013). In 
the ANCOVA model, there were now only marginally significant differences in the 
number of times major flaws were recognized by students with different amounts of 
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education (F(7, 251)=2.06, p=.086, hp2=.032). Score on the Actively Open-Minded 
Thinking questionnaire and percentile on the SAT/ACT also significantly and marginally 
significantly affected the number of flaws recognized (AOT: F(7, 251)=7.01, p<.01, 
hp2=.027; Percentile: F(7, 251)=2.92, p=.89, hp2=.011). There were no significant 
covariate effects on the number of explanations people provided. 
We also conducted a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA on number of evaluations, number of 
recognitions and number of explanations and found no significant interactions between 
condition (discuss vs. critically evaluate) and amount of education or between condition 
and major of interest (see Table 16). This indicates that, under the “critically evaluate” 
condition (as opposed to the “discuss this study” condition), participants with different 
amounts of education and different majors increased the number of evaluations, 
recognitions and explanations they provided by similar amounts.  
We conducted correlational analyses to help me better understand the relationship 
between my survey measures and students’ interpretation of the vignettes. A full table of 
non-vignette data correlations is presented in Table 14. As expected, correlational 
analyses revealed that the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Questionnaire, the Epistemic 
Beliefs Inventory and the Need for Cognition Scale were all significantly positively 
related to each other (AOT & EBI: r=.323, p<.01; AOT & NFC: r=.400, p<.01) . 
Actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition were also positively related to 
SAT/ACT percentile (AOT: r=.185, p<.01; NFC: r=.261, p<.01). There were also some 
significant positive relationships between the dispositional measures (AOT and NFC) and 
people’s self-reported interest in and critical reading of scientific studies and their self-
reported familiarity with the statistical flaws built into my vignettes. 
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Analyses with the vignette data (see Table 15), as expected, revealed that the 
number of evaluations that people provided was strongly positively related to the number 
of major flaws they recognized in both the “discuss the studies” and “critically evaluate 
the studies” conditions (DS: r=.790, p<.01; CE: r=.620, p<.01). However, unlike in the 
pilot study, the number of evaluations people provided was negatively related to the 
number of explanations they provided (r= -338, p<.01) in the “discuss the studies” 
condition, indicating that people either evaluated or explained the vignettes but not both. 
The number of explanations that people provided was also negatively related to the 
number of flaws that people recognized (r=-.280, p<.01) in the “discuss the studies” 
condition. 
Additionally, the dispositional measures (the Actively Open-Minded Thinking 
Questionnaire and the Need for Cognition Scale) were positively related to the number of 
evaluative statements the people provided in response to the vignettes (AOT: r=.209, 
p<.01; NFC: r=.269, p<.01) and to the number of times people recognized major flaws 
in the vignettes (AOT: r=.271, p<.01; NFC: r=.238, p<.01) in the “discuss the studies” 
condition. Interestingly, these correlations were also positive and significant in the  
“critically evaluate” condition. The dispositional measures were not related to the number 
of explanations that people provided. The Epistemic Belief Inventory was only 
significantly positively related to the number of evaluations provided in the “discuss the 
studies” condition.  
The number of statistical courses that a student had taken was also positively 
related to the number of evaluative statements provided in response to the vignettes 
(r=.133, p<.05) and to the number of flaws recognized (r=.126, p<.05) in the “discuss 
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the studies” condition. This was also true of the “critically evaluate the studies” 
condition. However, the number of statistical course taken was negatively related to the 
number of explanations provided in the “discuss the studies” condition, although this 
result was not significant (r=-.102, p>.05). 
We used regression analyses to examine whether evaluation of the vignette tasks 
and recognition of major flaws was predicted by general intelligence, thinking beliefs and 
dispositions and/or amount of statistics and methodological training. I created 4 
regression models: two with the number of evaluations as the dependent variable (one for 
the “discuss the studies” condition and one for the “critically evaluate the studies” 
condition), and two for the number of major flaws recognized (one for the “discuss the 
studies” condition and one for the “critically evaluate the studies” condition). For each of 
the models, I entered percentile on the ACT/SAT, number of statistics/methodology 
courses taken, and scores on the EBQ, AOT and NFC questionnaires as independent 
variables in the model.  
The first model, predicting number of evaluations provided when given the 
“discuss the studies” instructions explained a significant proportion of the variance, R2 = 
.113, F(5, 258) = 6.46, p< .001, with percentile on the SAT/ACT and need for cognition 
both significantly predicting number of evaluations (Percentile: b=.124, t(258)=1.99,  
p<.05; NFC: b=.151, t(258)=2.21, p<.05).  
The second model, predicting number of evaluations provided when given the 
“critically evaluate” instructions explained a significant proportion of the variance, R2 = 
.091, F(5, 258) =5.09, p< .001, with number of statistics and methodology courses taken 
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and need for cognition both significantly predicting number of evaluations 
(Stats/Methods Courses: b=.156, t(258)=2.56, p<.01; NFC: b=.170, t(258)=2.45, p<.05).  
The third model, predicting number of flaws recognized when given the “discuss 
the studies” instruction explained a significant proportion of the variance, R2 = .112, F(5, 
258) = 6.40, p< .001, with actively open-minded thinking significantly predicting number 
of flaws recognized (AOT: b=.204, t(258)=3.05, p<.01).  
The fourth model, predicting number of flaws recognized when given the 
“critically evaluate” instruction explained a significant proportion of the variance, R2 = 
.143, F(5, 258) = 8.45, p< .001, with percentile on the SAT/ACT, number of statistics 
and methodology courses taken and actively open-minded thinking all significantly 
predicting number of flaws recognized (Percentile: b=.118, t(258)=1.93,  
P=.05; Stats/Methods Courses: b=.115, t(258)=1.94, p<.05; AOT: b=.270, t(258)=4.11, 
p<.001).  
Discussion 
The results of this study give us insight into the processes that people use to 
evaluate research findings, as well as some understanding of why they engage in these 
processes. Ease of coding and strong inter-rater reliability indicates that Deanna Kuhn’s 
model of theory-evidence coordination can successfully be applied in this context. The 
participants’ responses easily fell into the categories evidence-based and explanation-
based. Despite the fact that the evidence presented to them contained major flaws, many 
participants still provided explanation-based responses to this evidence. However, 
participants were able to shift and provide more evidence-based responses when directly 
instructed to do so (in the “critically evaluate” condition). 
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We also found educational differences in the ways that people interpreted my 
flawed research findings vignettes. As in previous studies on critical thinking (Jehng et 
al., 1993; King & Kitchener, 2002; Toplak & Stanovich, 2003), I found that those with 
more educational experience (juniors, seniors) provided more critical, evidence-based 
responses to the vignettes while those with less educational experience (freshman, 
sophomores) provided more theory-driven and explanation-based responses. ANCOVA 
results indicated that the educational differences in number of evaluations provided and 
flaw recognized were perhaps mediated by both ability and dispositional factors. These 
results are in line with previous findings that higher educational experience is related to 
development of sophisticated epistemic beliefs and critical thinking skills such as belief-
bias avoidance.  
One limitation of this study is that the type of compensation (credit or payment) 
was confounded with the year in college variable. As is always the case, the students in 
Introductory Psychology were primarily freshman and sophomores, whereas the students 
I recruited from the Psychology, History and Engineering Departments were primarily 
juniors and seniors. This meant that more of the participants who received credit were 
freshman and sophomores and more of the participants who received payment were 
juniors and seniors. However, the type of compensation seemed to have little effect on 
people’s performance on the vignette tasks. When examined by year in college, 
compensation did not have a significant effect on any of the vignette coding dimensions 
except for on the number of explanations provided by sophomores in the “critically 
evaluate” condition (F(1, 76)=4.99, p<.05, hp2=.062) 
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Additionally, as in Lehman & Nisbett’s 1990 research on effects of undergraduate 
training on reasoning, I found differences in the ways students from different majors 
interpreted research findings. History and engineering students tended to be the most 
evaluative, offer a wide range of criticisms of the research findings presented in the 
vignettes and recognizing the most major flaws of any of the groups. Interestingly, 
psychology students were not as critical as history and engineering students, and did not 
recognize as many major flaws in the vignettes. This is in line with my findings from 
study 1 in which history and mechanical engineering tended to provide the most 
evaluations of vignettes. Perhaps this is because the psychology students were the most 
familiar with the types of findings presented in the vignettes (behavioral research 
findings), and therefore tended to accept them as valid. However, history and engineering 
students also had higher scores on the thinking disposition and ability measures, and 
ANCOVA results indicated that the educational differences in number of evaluations 
provided and flaw recognized were perhaps mediated by these ability and dispositional 
factors. 
We also found that many of predictions about the relationships between variables 
of interest were born out. The dispositional measures were related to the number of 
evaluations provided and the number of flaws recognized, but they were not related to the 
number of explanations that people provided. This indicates that, as Deanna Kuhn’s 
research suggests, critical thinking dispositions such as actively open-minded thinking 
and need for cognition are associated with evidence-based and not explanation-based 
reasoning. 
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My regression analyses revealed interesting patterns of results. The four models 
that I tested all predicted a significant proportion of the variance. Interestingly, the 
number of evaluations provided in the “discuss the studies” condition was predicted by 
percentile on the SAT/ACT and need for cognition, whereas number of evaluations 
provided in the critically evaluate condition was predicted by the number of statistics and 
methodology classes taken and need for cognition. This indicates that, when given 
freedom to interpret the research findings, those with a combination of general 
intelligence and the motivation to use that intelligence, will be both disposed and able to 
carefully evaluate what they are reading. However, when explicitly told to critically 
evaluate the research findings, it is those with the specific statistical and methodological 
experiences who are able to do so. This is largely in line with my original predictions that 
statistical and methodological skills would be most important when participants were 
directly told to critically evaluate vignettes.  
The number of flaws recognized when given the “discuss the studies” instructions 
was significantly predicted by actively open-minded thinking, whereas the number of 
flaws recognized in the “critically evaluate” condition was predicted by actively open-
minded thinking, percentile and the number of statistics and methodology courses taken. 
This is interesting because it indicates that it is a dispositional factor that predicts 
people’s tendency to seek out and perform the task at hand, even when not explicitly told 
to do so. 
                                                                      





The current work examines the processes that people use to interpret research 
findings and helps us to understand why they engage in these processes. It makes a 
contribution to the literature in two important ways: by applying Deanna Kuhn’s theory-
evidence coordination in a new and important context, and by providing a better 
understanding of experiential, dispositional and ability factors underlying theory-
evidence coordination. One of the greatest strengths of this work is its innovative 
methodology that allows for analysis of open-ended, authentic data. Creating instruments 
and coding schemes that examine the process by which people interpret research findings 
as well as applying previously validated instruments to understand why people engage in 
this process are important steps in understanding what factors allow people to become 
careful consumers of evidence. 
I do not attempt to argue against the importance of explaining evidence and 
incorporating it into one’s existing body of knowledge and beliefs (Zimmerman, 2000). 
There are many circumstances in which theory-driven reasoning is appropriate (Meehl, 
2002).  For example, Koslowski (1996) argues that scientist rely on theory or mechanism 
to decide which of the many covariations in the world are likely to be causal, and that this 
is a scientifically legitimate way to reason.  I agree with this argument; however, I would 
argue there are certain circumstances that demand that evidence be considered carefully 
before one moves on to the level of explanation. This work is an attempt to 
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examine the ways in which people operate in such situations as well as the factors that 
underlie their approach to such evidence. 
Looking across the two studies, my results indicate that people's interpretations of 
experimental results can be successfully coded using models such as Kuhn’s theory-
evidence coordination model into evidence-based and explanation-based reasoning. 
These results are a promising indication that authentic, open-ended data can be 
successfully managed and used to study critical thinking. 
 These results also provide additional support for Deanna Kuhn’s model of 
theory-evidence coordination. In reasoning processes that conform to the theory-evidence 
coordination model, evidence figures heavily, and must be carefully evaluated in order to 
determine its quality. Theories are developed in tandem with evidence, and it is the 
theory associated with the higher quality and most consistent evidence that is selected. 
On the other hand, in reasoning processes that conform to a satisficing model, evidence 
does not play a large role and is largely disregarded, especially when it is inconsistent 
with previously existing theories. Plausible explanations are sufficient to dictate the 
validity of a theory and alternative theories are not considered. My findings lend support 
to the existence of these two types of reasoning. In my studies, participants’ responses 
were easily and successfully coded into evidence and explanation-based responses. 
Additionally, participants’ evidence-based responses were related to and predicted by 
some of the educational, belief and dispositional factors that Kuhn discusses in her work 
(Kuhn, 2001). Therefore, my work lends support to Kuhn’s model and extends its scope 
to a new and important domain of study: people’s open-ended interpretation of research 
findings.  
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I found that those with more higher educational training tended to provide more 
evidence-based interpretations of research findings. In both of my studies, those at more 
advanced stages their higher education (graduate students in study 1, advanced 
undergraduates in study 2) provided more evaluations of the research findings presented 
to them. When I examined educational differences by major/field of study, I found that 
psychology students tended to provide explanations and descriptions of the research 
findings as opposed to evaluations of them. On the other hand, history and engineering 
students were more likely to evaluate (and often criticize) the research findings. This 
distinction could be a product of the fact that psychologists are more familiar and 
therefore perhaps more comfortable with the kinds of behavioral research findings 
presented in the vignettes. History and engineering student are less familiar and therefore 
perhaps more wary of the methodologies used in the studies described.  
These differences could also be driven by differences on my thinking disposition 
and ability measures. In study 2 I found that history and engineering majors tended to 
have higher scores on actively open-minded thinking (especially history majors), need for 
cognition (especially engineering majors) and SAT/ACT percentile (especially 
engineering majors) than psychologists. It could be that these factors contributed to the 
larger number of evaluations provided by these groups. Additionally, ANCOVA analyses 
revealed significant effects of dispositional and ability measures as covariates. That 
interpretation would be consistent with previous findings that those with sophisticated 
thinking dispositions perform well on critical thinking tasks (Klaczynski & Robinson, 
2000; Stanovich & West, 1997). 
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These findings extend previous work looking at higher educational effects on 
critical thinking constructs such as epistemic beliefs, thinking dispositions, belief-bias 
avoidance and theory-evidence coordination (Jehng et al., 1993; King & Kitchener, 2002, 
Kuhn, 2001; Toplak & Stanovich, 2003). In my studies, as in other studies, I found that 
students with more higher educational training tended to have more sophisticated 
epistemic beliefs and thinking dispositions, and tended to engage in more critical, 
evidence-based reasoning. Additionally, my findings extend the work of Lehman, 
Lempert & Nisbett (1988) and Lehman & Nisbett (1990), which examined the effects of 
discipline-specific graduate and undergraduate education on a range of reasoning skills. 
Findings from my studies show discipline-specific differences in the ways that graduate 
and undergraduate students approach the task of interpreting research findings.  
Psychology students in both my graduate and undergraduate studies were more accepting 
of the research findings as compared with other graduate and advanced undergraduate 
groups, most likely because of their familiarity with the types of findings being 
presented. Interestingly, however, these students’ statistical and methodological training 
did not help them to recognize the major flaws that I built into my studies. Further 
research is needed in order to better understand the performance of my discipline-specific 
groups. 
Findings from study 2 reveal significant relationships between many of the factors 
of interest. As expected, factors such as general intelligence, thinking dispositions, and 
number of statistics courses taken were positively related to evidence-based reasoning 
(and negatively related to explanation-based reasoning). Additionally, I created a number 
of predictive models that provide a better picture of what factors underlie evidence-based 
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reasoning and flaw recognition. It is clear that, while some less malleable factors such as 
general intelligence are important predictors of people’s evidence-based reasoning, there 
are other predictive factors that are experiential and/or possible to train. For example, I 
find that actively open-minded thinking was a strong predictor of the number of vignette 
flaws a person recognized. This is a disposition that is closely related to epistemic beliefs 
and is very likely affected by higher educational experience (Jehng et al., 1993). 
Additionally, the number of statistics and methodology courses people had taken was 
predictive of the number of evaluations they provided and the number of flaws they 
recognized when given the instructions to critically evaluate the vignettes. Again, this is a 
good example of experiential factors that contribute to a person’s ability to think 
carefully and critically about research findings.  
Future research in this area might focus on educational factors that produce good 
evidence-based reasoners. One possible direction for future research would be to provide 
training on predictive factors that can be influenced by experience and training. As these 
predictive factors are improved, evidence-based reasoning should improve as well. 
Conversely, evidence-based reasoning could be taught or trained directly. In my studies, 
history students appear to be ahead of the crowd in terms of evidence-based reasoning; 
however, further research is needed to better understand these educational differences and 
what contributes to them. If it is the case that people in some fields are trained to be 
better evidence-based reasoners than others, is there something to be learned from the 
way that these people are being trained?  
On the other hand it could be that, as with the history vs. psychology students, 
people are more critical of evidence that is not familiar to them just as they are more 
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critical of evidence with which they disagree (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979). This did seem 
to be the case in study 1, where undergraduates provided more evaluations of unfamiliar 
(cognitive psychology) vignettes as opposed to familiar (general knowledge) vignettes. 
This distinction between reasoning in familiar and unfamiliar contexts could be used as a 
teaching tool. Previous research has shown that contrasting cases can be a powerful way 
to get people thinking carefully and actively (Schwartz & Bransford, 1998). Perhaps one 
way to train people to be more critical would be to present them with evidence from a 
familiar and unfamiliar discipline, and to point out differences in the way the two types of 
evidence are interpreted. 
Another potential area for fruitful research would be to examine how context 
affects the ways that people interpret data. In the current studies, the rate at which 
individuals’ critically evaluate data, even when explicit and major flaws are built into 
studies, is arguably small (about 20% of the flaws were noted when individuals were 
asked to discuss research findings, and 27% when asked to critically evaluate research 
findings).  Future research might consider how various characteristics of research 
vignettes influence the likelihood that individuals critically evaluate versus simply 
explain/relate data to prior knowledge.  One factor that might influence how critical 
individuals are may be the existence of graphs depicting the data. I was unable to 
compare data from study 1 (where graphs accompanied vignettes) and study 2 (where 
vignettes were presented alone) because of many other differences between the two 
studies. However, one study by Fagerlin, Ubel & Wang (2005) in a medical decision 
making context found that individuals were less influenced by personal anecdotes and 
more influenced by statistical information when data were presented in a graph compared 
                                                                      
      
 60 
 
to in-text.  Similarly, individuals may be more focused on the actual data and less likely 
to activate their prior experiences if study descriptions include visual displays of data.  
Such visual displays may also highlight certain flaws by making them more visually 
salient (e.g., small effect sizes) or by emphasizing the key variables in the study as 
opposed to the factors considered in a broader interpretation of data.  While graphs may 
help individuals focus on the data and perhaps lead them to be more critical of data, it is 
plausible that personal anecdotes included in a media story about a research findings may 
have the impact of interfering with individuals’ focus on the data and, therefore, making 
them less critical.  
Also, the credibility and trustworthiness of the source of the research findings also 
has a likely influence on the critical evaluation of data (Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002).  
Prior research has found that the trustworthiness of sources influence how likely 
individuals are to be persuaded by messages depending on the source (Andreoli & 
Worchel, 1978).  Furthermore, research has shown that individuals are more likely to 
elaborate upon and critically examine ideas when they come from a less trustworthy 
source than a more trustworthy source (Priester& Petty, 1995).  It follow from this 
research that individuals are likely to be more critical of scientific data when the source is 
less trustworthy. Identification of such factors that influence how critically individuals 
read research findings might help us to gain a better understanding of situations in which 
people are likely to be more or less critical and could have application in a wide range of 
contexts such as science journalism, textbook writing and classrooms.  
People are consistently placed in situations in which they need to use data to make 
decisions. Many believe that, in order for people to fully participate as members of their 
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communities and societies, they must be able to use data to think carefully and actively 
about a wide range of issues. Additionally, increased economic competition associated 
with globalization means that people are being exposed to more complex, technologically 
driven environments. Researchers, educators, educational policy-makers, and employers 
agree that students need to learn to “think well” now more than ever before. I hope that 
my work makes a significant contribution to the body of knowledge on how people can 
and do think critically in their everyday lives and what underlies this skill.   
 
 
                                                                      




Study 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Vignette Tasks 
# of Quantitative 
Descriptions 
(SD) 
# of Explanations 
(SD) 
# of Evaluations 
(SD) 






























Cog Psych Grads 9.22 (5.49) 2.56 (4.00) 4.89 (2.80) 















                                                                      






Pilot Study Descriptive Statistics 














3.18 (2.42) 4.06 (2.55) 
# of Flaws  
Recognized 
1.51 (1.91) 2.06 (1.82) 
# of 
Explanations 














                                                                      



































































































                                                                      





ANOVA Results for Lab vs. Non-lab Participants 
Vignette Task Degree of Freedom F Value Sig (p) Partial Eta 
Squared 
Discuss Studies: Evaluations 1, 29 1.25 .265 .005 
Discuss Studies: 
Flaws Recognized 
1, 29 .045 .831 .000 
Discuss Studies: 
Explanations 
1, 29 .538 .464 .002 
Critically Evaluate: 
Evaluations 
1, 29 1.44 .231 .005 
Critically Evaluate: 
Flaws Recognized 
1, 29 .290 .591 .001 
Critically Evaluate: 
Explanations 





























                                                                      






Study 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation Range 
NFC 62.08 10.48 53.00 
AOT 150.70 19.63 104.00 
EBQ 91.59 9.59 92.00 
Percentile 
SAT/ACT 
91.53 9.35 59.00 




4.78 1.66 6.00 
Critical of 
Studies 




4.18 0.99 4.00 
Fam w/ 
Oper. 








4.33 0.88 4.00 
Discuss Studies 
# Evals 




1.60 1.47 7.00 
DS 
# Expls 
2.88 2.01 8.00 
Crit Evaluate 
# Evals 








3.24 2.37 8.00 
# of Stats  
Courses 
0.60 0.84 6.00 
 
                                                                      





Vignette Descriptive Statistics by Year in College 


































































































                                                                      





Vignette Descriptive Statistics by Major 












































































































                                                                      





















Freshman 58.56 (9.02) 145.53 (20.60) 89.96 (9.51) 90.24 (9.18) 
Sophomore 
 
62.82 (11.22) 150.21 (18.62) 92.14 (8.70) 92.19 (7.98) 
Junior 
 
63.20 (11.08) 152.22 (19.62) 91.63 (10.52) 90.12 (12.45) 
Senior 
 

















                                                                      

















Percentile SAT/ACT Mean 
(SD) 
Engineering 65.25 (9.77) 153.67 (20.48) 90.44 (11.78) 94.41 (4.74) 
History 
 
64.96 (11.07) 159.49 (20.24) 95.09 (7.95) 92.74 (8.96) 
Psychology 
 
61.58 (9.25) 146.55 (16.20) 90.24 (8.74) 92.12 (7.03) 
Undeclared 
 
58.90 (10.19) 148.36 (20.14) 90.75 (7.53) 90.36 (10.89) 
Other 
 

















                                                                      
































































                                                                      

















Engineering 5.17 (.941) 5.89 (1.26) 4.89 (1.45) 
History 
 
5.28 (.885) 3.92 (1.69) 3.91 (1.70) 
Psychology 
 
4.52 (1.35) 4.91 (1.63) 4.45 (1.72) 
Undeclared 
 
4.75 (1.11) 4.70 (1.61) 3.94 (1.69) 
Other 
 
















                                                                      








































































                                                                      

















Engineering 4.31 (1.04) 4.14 (1.02) 4.11 (.95) 4.50 (.66) 
History 
 
4.28 (.84) 3.92 (1.11) 3.81 (.94) 4.38 (.81) 
Psychology 
 
4.42 (.87) 3.88 (1.27) 4.27 (.84) 4.73 (.52) 
Undeclared 
 
4.04 (1.03) 3.49 (1.23) 3.40 (1.13) 4.19 (1.00) 
Other 
 





                                                                      






Percentage of People who Recognized Flaw in Each Vignette by Year in College and 
Major 
 Fresh Soph Jun Sen Eng His Psych Und Oth 
Obesity 3.8 11.5 3.9 23 8.3 17.0 9.1 5.2 13 
Creativity 7.7 14.1 17.6 21.3 25.0 18.9 9.1 10.4 13 
Abuse 10.3 12.8 25.5 34.4 19.4 34 12.1 9.1 23.2 
Runners 10.3 10.3 5.9 19.7 8.3 5.7 24.2 10.4 13 
IQ 6.4 6.4 15.7 19.7 19.4 13.2 15.2 6.5 8.7 
Video 
Games 
29.5 26.9 31.4 49.2 36.1 49.1 27.3 27.3 30.4 
Day Care 1.3 5.1 7.8 3.3 8.3 3.8 6.1 1.3 4.3 
































                                                                      








Correlations with Non-Vignette Data 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 




































































































































































































































*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
                                                                      








Correlations with Vignette Data 














EBQ .178** .112 .093 .079 .070 .097 
NFC .269** .238** -.012 .262** .238** -.011 









.181** -.081 .157* .207** .011 
Media 
Interest 




.067 .062 .038 .045 .077 .085 
Critical of 
Studies 




.246** .256** -.049 .198** .252** .103 
Fam w/ 
Oper. 








.196** .206 -.002 .119 .176** .036 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
                                                                      






Non-significant Interaction Effects: x Amount of Education x Condition (Discuss Study 
vs. Critically Evaluate) and Major x Condition (Discuss Study vs. Critically Evaluate) 









# of Evaluations: Effect of Amount of 
Education x Condition 
3, 264 2.04 .109 .023 
# of Recognitions: Effect of Amount of 
Education x Condition 
3, 264 .633 .594 .007 
# of Explanations: Effects of Amount of 
Education x Condition 
3, 264 .548 .650 .006 
# of Evaluations: Effect of Major x 
Condition 
4, 263 1.76 .137 .026 
# of Recognitions: Effect of Major x 
Condition 
4, 263 .930 .447 .014 
# of Explanations: Effects of Major x 
Condition 
4, 263 .325 .861 .005 
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Undergrads  Social Psych  History  Mech Eng  Cog Psych 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Undergrads  Social Psych  History  Mech Eng  Cog Psych 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Undergrads  Social Psych  History  Mech Eng  Cog Psych 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Pilot Study Vignettes 
Misinterpretation of correlational data (i.e. correlation/causation confusion) 
 
A study of 77 children aged 3 to 5 found that those with the most body fat had the most 
“controlling” mothers when it came to the amount of food eaten. “The more control the 
mother reported using over her child’s eating, the less self-regulation the child 
displayed,” Dr. Johnson and her co-author said.  
 
A recent study followed the health of 481 members of a runners’ club and 330 
nonrunners living in the same community. All participants were 50-72 when the study 
began. They found that long-distance running was associated with good physical function 
in the later years, compared with more sedentary life styles. They said the findings 
underscored the importance of promoting “regular lifetime physical exercise to improve 
the quality of life of the growing older population.” 
 
Unclear operationalization of variables 
 
A researcher interested in how creativity in scientific reasoning changes with age 
conducted a study. He asked colleagues of hundreds of randomly chosen scientists from 
across the United States to rank the mean number of creative scientific accomplishments 
that their colleagues had made over the past year. He calculated with average number of 
creative accomplishments as a function of age, and found that number of creative 
accomplishments increased from age 20-35 and then began to decline.  
 
One in four adolescents said they were abused within the past year, according to a new 
survey. The telephone survey of 2,000 children ages 10 to 16, suggests, “We’re not doing 
a very good job of counting and tracking the problem,” said David Finkelhor, a 
sociologist at the University of New Hampshire and co-author of the study. 
 
Over-interpretation of small effect sizes 
 
The eldest children in families tend to develop higher I.Q.'s than their siblings, 
researchers are reporting today, in a large study (two papers) that could settle more than a 
half-century of scientific debate about the relationship between I.Q. and birth order. The 
average difference in I.Q. was three points higher in the eldest child than in the closest 
sibling. ''I consider these two papers the most important publications to come out in this 
field in 70 years; it's a dream come true,'' said Frank J. Sulloway, a psychologist at the 
Institute of Personality and Social Research at the University of California, Berkeley. 
 
A study of American child care has found that keeping a preschooler in a day care center 
for a year or more increased the likelihood that the child would become disruptive in 
class -- and that the effect persisted through the sixth grade. Every year spent in such 
centers for at least 10 hours per week was associated with a 1 percent higher score on a 
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standardized assessment of problem behaviors completed by teachers, said Dr. Margaret 
Burchinal, a co-author of the study and a psychologist at the University of North 
Carolina. With more than two million American preschoolers attending day care, the 
increased disruptiveness very likely contributes to the load on teachers who must manage 




A recent study shows that Americans are more interested in politics than was previously 
thought. Researchers approached people at events such as town meetings and city council 
meetings and surveyed them about their interest in political and their voting behavior. 
Seventy percent of those surveyed reported that they were planning to vote in upcoming 
local and national elections. More than half said that they regularly read articles in the 
newspaper about political issues.   
 
A study conducted by Market Research International shows that educational video games 
are just as popular as non-educational video games. The researchers conducted their 
study at a local university with children of university professors. They allowed the 
children to play a variety of educational and non-educational video games. They then 
measured the amount of time the children spent playing the two types of games. 
Interestingly, the amount of time that children spent playing educational video games was 






                                                                      




Study 2 Vignettes 
 
Misinterpretation of correlational data (i.e. correlation/causation confusion) 
 
As part of a recent study, researchers measured children's body fat and surveyed  
mothers about the amount of control they exert over their children's eating. The  
results of this study, conducted with 77 children aged 3 to 5, found that those with  
the most body fat had the most “controlling” mothers when it came to the amount of  
food eaten. This shows that when mothers exert more control over their children's  
eating, the children display less self-control, researchers said. 
 
A recent study followed the health of 481 members of a runners’ club and 330  
nonrunners living in the same community. All participants were 50-72 when the study  
began. Researchers found that long-distance runners had better physical function in  
the later years compared with those with more sedentary life styles. They said the  
findings underscored the importance of promoting regular lifetime physical exercise  
to improve the health of the growing older population. 
 
Unclear operationalization of variables 
 
A researcher interested in how creativity in scientific reasoning changes with age  
conducted a study. He asked colleagues of hundreds of randomly chosen scientists  
from across the United States to rank the mean number of creative scientific  
accomplishments that their colleagues had made over the past year. He calculated  
the average number of creative accomplishments as a function of age, and found  
that number of creative accomplishments increased from age 20-35 and then began  
to decline.  
 
One in four adolescents said they were abused within the past year, according to  
a new survey. As part of the telephone survey of 2,000 children ages 10 to 16,  
participants were asked to report whether they had been abused in the past year.  
The result suggests that we have not been doing a very good job of counting and  
tracking the problem, the researchers said. 
 
Over-interpretation of small effect sizes 
 
The eldest children in families tend to develop higher I.Q.s than their siblings,  
researchers are reporting today in a large study that could settle more than a half- 
century of scientific debate about the relationship between I.Q. and birth order. The  
average difference in I.Q. was three points higher in the eldest child than in the  
closest sibling. This paper is one of the most important publications to come out in  
this field in many years, researchers said. 
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A study of American child care has found that keeping a preschooler in a day care  
center for a year or more increased the likelihood that the child would become  
disruptive in class -- and that the effect persisted through the sixth grade. Every  
year spent in such centers for at least 10 hours per week was associated with a 1  
percent higher score on a standardized assessment of problem behaviors completed  
by teachers. With more than two million American preschoolers attending day care,  
the increased disruptiveness very likely contributes to the load on teachers who must  





A recent study shows that children enjoy playing educational video games just as  
much as they enjoy playing non-educational video games. The researchers  
conducted their study at a local university with children of university professors.  
They required the children to play a variety of educational and non-educational video  
games. They then asked children to rate how much they enjoyed playing the two  
types of games. Interestingly, children's enjoyment of educational video games was  
not significantly different from their enjoyment of non-educational video games.  
 
A recent study shows that Americans are more interested in politics than was  
previously thought. Researchers approached people at events such as town  
meetings and city council meetings and surveyed them about their interest in politics  
and their voting behavior. Seventy percent of those surveyed reported that they  
were planning to vote in upcoming local and national elections. More than half said  












                                                                      




Actively Open-Minded Thinking Questionnaire 
This questionnaire lists a series of statements about various topics. Read each statement 
and decide whether you agree or disagree with each statement as follows: 
  
1 - Disagree Strongly, 2 - Disagree Moderately, 3 - Disagree Slightly, 4 - Agree Slightly, 
5 - Agree Moderately, 6 - Agree Strongly 
  
Mark the alternative that best describes your opinion. There are no right or wrong 
answers so do not spend too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing that comes 
to mind is probably the best response. Be sure the number on the answer sheet 
corresponds to the number of the statement to which you are responding. There is no time 
limit, but work as quickly as possible. 
  
1.    Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is 
unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups. 
(Reflected) 
  
2.    What beliefs you hold have more to do with your own personal character than the 
experiences that may have given rise to them. (Reflected) 
  
3.    I tend to classify people as either for me or against me. (Reflected) 
  
4.    A person should always consider new possibilities. 
  
5.    There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those 
who are against the truth. (Reflected) 
  
6.    Changing your mind is a sign of weakness. (Reflected) 
  
7.    I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues. 
(Reflected) 
  
8.    I think there are many wrong ways, but only one right way, to almost anything. 
(Reflected) 
  
9.    It makes me happy and proud when someone famous holds the same beliefs that I do. 
(Reflected) 
  
10. Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than 
through waiting for good fortune. 
  
11. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand 
for. (Reflected) 
                                                                      




12. Abandoning a previous belief is a sign of strong character. 
  
13. No one can talk me out of something I know is right. (Reflected) 
  
14. Basically, I know everything I need to know about the important things in life. 
(Reflected) 
  
15. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear 
against them. (Reflected) 
  
16. Considering too many different opinions often leads to bad decisions. (Reflected) 
  
17. There are basically two kinds of people in this world, good and bad. (Reflected) 
  
18. I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people's lifestyles. 
  
19. Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can be 
made against them. (Reflected) 
  
20. Most people just don't know what's good for them. (Reflected) 
  
21. It is a noble thing when someone holds the same beliefs as their parents. (Reflected) 
  
22. Coming to decisions quickly is a sign of wisdom. (Reflected) 
  
23. I believe that loyalty to one's ideals and principles is more important than "open-
mindedness." (Reflected) 
  
24. Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world there is probably only one 
which is correct. (Reflected) 
  
25. My beliefs would not have been very different if I had been raised by a different set 
of parents. (Reflected) 
  
26. If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it. 
  
27. I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies have 
may be valid for them. 
  
28. Even if my environment (family, neighborhood, schools) had been different, I 
probably would have the same religious views. (Reflected) 
  
29. There is nothing wrong with being undecided about many issues. 
  
30. I believe that laws and social policies should change to reflect the needs of a changing 
                                                                      





31. My blood boils over whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong. 
(Reflected) 
  
32. I believe that the "new morality" of permissiveness is no morality at all. (Reflected) 
  
33. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with your established beliefs. 
(Reflected) 
  
34. Someone who attacks my beliefs is not insulting me personally. 
  
35. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its members cannot 
exist for long. (Reflected) 
  
36. Often, when people criticize me, they don't have their facts straight. (Reflected) 
  
37. Beliefs should always be revised in response to new information or evidence. 
  
38. I think that if people don't know what they believe in by the time they're 25, there's 
something wrong with them. (Reflected) 
  
39. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and mislead 
them. (Reflected) 
  
40. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions. (Reflected) 
  
41. People should always take into consideration evidence that goes 


















                                                                      




Need for Cognition Questionnaire 
For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is 
characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like 
you) please mark a “1”; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you (very much 
like you) please mark a “5”. There are no right or wrong answers so do not spend  
too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing that comes to mind is probably the 
best response. There is no time limit, but work as quickly as possible.  
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. (Reflected) 
 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure 
to challenge my thinking abilities. (Reflected) 
 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to 
think in depth about something. (Reflected) 
 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
 
7. I only think as hard as I have to. (Reflected) 
 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. (Reflected) 
 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. (Reflected) 
 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.  
 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. (Reflected) 
 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought.  
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16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 
mental effort. (Reflected) 
 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it 
works. (Reflected) 
 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally. 
 
                                                                      




Epistemic Belief Inventory 
This questionnaire lists a series of statements about various topics. Read each statement 
and decide whether you agree or disagree with each statement. Mark the alternative that 
best describes your opinion. There are no right or wrong answers so do not spend too 
much time deciding on an answer. The first thing that comes to mind is probably  
the best response. There is no time limit, but work as quickly as possible. 
 
Responses:  




5-strongly agree  
 
1. Most things worth knowing are easy to understand. 
2. What is true is a matter of opinion. 
3. Students who learn things quickly are the most successful. 
4. People should always obey the law. 
5. People's intellectual potential is fixed at birth. 
6. Absolute moral truth does not exist. 
7. Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life. 
8. Really smart students don't have to work as hard to do well in school. 
9. If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely end up  
being confused. 
 
10. Too many theories just complicate things. 
11. The best ideas are often the most simple. 
12. Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories. 
13. Some people are born with special gifts and talents. 
14. How well you do in school depends on how smart you are. 
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15. If you don't learn something quickly, you won't ever learn it. 
16. Some people just have a knack for learning and others don't. 
17. Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe. 
18. If two people are arguing about something, at least one of them must be wrong. 
19. Children should be allowed to question their parents' authority. 
20. If you haven't understood a chapter the first time through, going back over it  
won't help. 
 
21. Science is easy to understand because it contains so many facts. 
22. The more you know about a topic, the more there is to know. 
23. What is true today will be true tomorrow. 
24. Smart people are born that way. 
25. When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it. 
26. People shouldn't question authority. 
27. Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time. 






                                                                      




Study 2 Background/Follow-Up Questions 
Please answer the following questions: 




2. What is your age? 
 










5. What is your major? 
 
6. What statistics and research methods courses have you taken and what were  
your grades in those courses? Please list each course and its grade on a separate  
line. 
 
7. Did you find your statistics and/or research methods courses to be interesting and  
useful? Please answer separately for each course. 
 
8. What has been your favorite course in college or high school? 
 
9. What has been your least favorite course in college or high school? 
 
10. Please report your SAT scores (n/a if you didn't take it). 
Composite SAT score 
Verbal SAT score 
Math SAT score 
 
11. Please report your ACT scores (n/a if you didn't take it). 
Composite ACT score 
English ACT score 
Math ACT score 
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1. How frequently do you read/watch/listen to news media outlets such as newspapers, 
magazines, TV news or radio news? 
Every day  
Multiple days a week  
Once a week  
Once or twice a month  
Less than once a month  
Never  
 
2. I am interested in reading about science-related news.   
Agree strongly  
Agree  
Agree somewhat  
No opinion  
Disagree somewhat  
Disagree  
Disagree strongly  
 
3. I am a critical reader of scientific studies.  
Agree strongly  
Agree  
Agree somewhat  
No opinion  
Disagree somewhat  
Disagree  
Disagree strongly  
 
Prior Belief Items: 
 
4. "When mothers' exert control over their children's eating this can cause children to 
overeat." 
Prior to completing this study, the above statement would've fit with my beliefs and 
experiences. 
Agree strongly  
Agree  
Agree somewhat  
No opinion  
Disagree somewhat  
Disagree  
Disagree strongly  
 
5. "Scientists' creative accomplishments increase from ages 20-35 and then begin to 
                                                                      




Prior to completing this study, the above statement would've fit with my beliefs and 
experiences. 
Agree strongly  
Agree  
Agree somewhat  
No opinion  
Disagree somewhat  
Disagree  
Disagree strongly  
 
6. "1 in 4 adolescents experience abuse every year." 
Prior to completing this study, the above statement would've fit with my beliefs and 
experiences. 
Agree strongly  
Agree  
Agree somewhat  
No opinion  
Disagree somewhat  
Disagree  
Disagree strongly  
 
7. "Physical exercise, such as running, causes improved physical functioning in older 
adults." 
Prior to completing this study, the above statement would've fit with my beliefs and 
experiences. 
Agree strongly  
Agree  
Agree somewhat  
No opinion  
Disagree somewhat  
Disagree  
Disagree strongly  
 
8. "Older siblings are more intelligent than younger siblings." 
Prior to completing this study, the above statement would've fit with my beliefs and 
experiences. 
Agree strongly  
Agree  
Agree somewhat  
No opinion  
Disagree somewhat  
Disagree  
Disagree strongly  
 
9. "Children like to play educational video games just as much as non-educational video 
                                                                      




Prior to completing this study, the above statement would've fit with my beliefs and 
experiences. 
Agree strongly  
Agree  
Agree somewhat  
No opinion  
Disagree somewhat  
Disagree  
Disagree strongly  
 
10. "Children who attend daycare are more disruptive than children cared for at home." 
Prior to completing this study, the above statement would've fit with my beliefs and 
experiences. 
Agree strongly  
Agree  
Agree somewhat  
No opinion  
Disagree somewhat  
Disagree  
Disagree strongly  
 
11. "More people are interested in politics than is usually thought." 
Prior to completing this study, the above statement would've fit with my beliefs and 
experiences. 
Agree strongly  
Agree  
Agree somewhat  
No opinion  
Disagree somewhat  
Disagree  
Disagree strongly  
 
Familiarity with Statistics/Methodology Items: 
 
12. Are you familiar with the idea that just because two variables are correlated 
doesn't mean that one causes the other? 
Very familiar  
Familiar  
Somewhat familiar  
Not very familiar  
Not at all familiar  
 
13. Are you familiar with the idea that one must clearly define a variable in order to  
measure it? This process is often know as operationalization.  
Very familiar  
                                                                      




Somewhat familiar  
Not very familiar  
Not at all familiar  
 
14. Are you familiar with the idea that you must examine the size of a quantitative 
research effect (a.k.a. effect size) in order to determine how large or important the  
result is? 
Very familiar  
Familiar  
Somewhat familiar  
Not very familiar  
Not at all familiar  
 
15. Are you familiar with the idea that, for the purposes of research, one must select  
a sample of participants that represents the population of interest?  
Very familiar  
Familiar  
Somewhat familiar  
Not very familiar  


























                                                                      






Andreoli, V. & Worchel, S. (1978). Effects of Media, Communicator, and Message 
Position on Attitude Change. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 42 (1), 59-70. 
 
Baron, J. (1985). Rationality and intelligence. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Baron, J. (1987). Being disposed to thinking: A typology of attitudes and dispositions 
related to acquiring and using thinking skills. Boston, MA: University of 
Massachusetts, Critical and Creative Thinking Program. 
 
Baron, J. (2000). Thinking and deciding (3rd ed.): Cambridge University Press. 
 
Baron, J., Badgio, P. C. & Gaskins, T. W. (1986). Cognitive style and its improvement: A 
normative approach. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of 
human intelligence (Vol. 3, pp. 173-220). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Brem, S. K. & Rips, L. J. (2000). Explanation and evidence in informal argument. 
Cognitive Science, 24(4), 573-604. 
 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 42(1), 116-131. 
 
Chandler, M., Boyes, M., & Ball, L. (1990).Relativism and stations of epistemic doubt. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 50, 370–395. 
 
 
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO personality inventory. Odessa, FL: 
 Psychological Assessment Resources. 
 
Dawes, R. (1994). House of cards: Psychotherapy built on myth. New York: Free Press. 
 
Edwards, K. & Smith, E. E. (1996). A disconfirmation bias in the evaluation of 
arguments.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(1), 5-24. 
 
Epstein, S., & Meier, P. (1989). Constructive thinking: a broad coping variable with 
 specific components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 332–350. 
 
Fagerlin, A., Ubel, P. A., & Wang, C. (2005).Reducing the influence of anecdotal 
reasoning on people's health care decisions: Is a picture worth a thousand 
statistics? Medical Decision Making, 25, 398-405. 
 
Halpern, D. F. (1998). Teaching critical thinking for transfer across domains: 
                                                                      
      
 114 
 
Dispositions, skills, structure training and metacognitive monitoring. American 
Psychologist, 55(4), 449-455. 
 
Halpern, D. F. (2001). Assessing the effectiveness of critical thinking instruction. The 
Journal of General Education, 50(4), 270-286. 
 
Halpern, D. F. (2007).The nature and nurture of critical thinking. In R. J. Sternberg, H. 
L. Roediger III, & D. F. Halpern (Eds.), Critical thinking in psychology. (pp. 1-
14). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Harp, S. F., & Mayer, R. E. (1998). How Seductive Details Do Their Damage: A Theory 
of Cognitive Interest in Science Learning. Journal of Educational Psychology, 90, 
100-103. 
 
Hatfield, J. & Faunce, G. J. (2006). Avoiding confusion surrounding the phrase 
‘correlation does not imply causation.’ Teaching of Psychology, 33(1), 49-51. 
 
Jehng, J. J., Johnson, S. D. & Anderson, R. C.(1993). Schooling and students’ 
epistemological beliefs about learning. Contemporary Educational Psychology,  
18, 23-35. 
 
King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (2002). The Reflective Judgment Model: Twenty years 
of research on epistemic cognition. In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), 
Personal epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing. 
(pp. 37-61). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. 
 
Kitchener, K. S., & King, P. M. (1981). Reflective judgment: Concepts of justification 
and their relationship to age and education. Journal of Applied Developmental 
Psychology, 2(2), 89-116. 
 
Klaczynski, P. A. (2000). Motivated scientific reasoning biases, epistemological beliefs, 
and theory polarization: A two-process approach to adolescent cognition. Child 
Development, 71(5), 1347-1366. 
 
Klaczynski, P. A., Gordon, D. H., & Fauth, J. (1997). Goal-oriented critical reasoning 
And individual differences in critical reasoning biases. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 89(3), 470-485. 
 
Klaczynski, P. A., & Robinson, B. (2000). Personal theories, intellectual ability, and 
epistemological beliefs: Adult age differences in everyday reasoning biases. 
Psychology and Aging, 15(3), 400-416. 
 
Koslowski, B. (1996).Theory and evidence: The development of scientific reasoning. 
 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument: Cambridge University Press. 
                                                                      




Kuhn, D. (1993). Thinking as an epistemological enterprise. Applied Psychology: An  
International Review, 42(3), 226-228. 
 
Kuhn, D. (1995). Microgenetic study of change: What has it told us? Psychological 
Science,6, 133-139. 
 
Kuhn, D. (1999). A developmental model of critical thinking. Educational Researcher, 
28(2),16-25. 
 
Kuhn, D. (2001). How do people know? Psychological Science, 12(1), 1-8. 
 
Kuhn, D., & Dean, D., Jr. (2004). Metacognition: A bridge between cognitive psychology 
and educational practice. Theory into practice, 43(4). 
 
Kuhn, D., Pennington, N., & Leadbeater, B. (1983). Adult thinking in developmental 
 perspective: The sample case of juror reasoning. In P. Baltes & O. Brim (Eds.), 
 Life-span development and behavior, Vol. 5(pp. 158–195). New York: Academic 
Press. 
 
Kuhn, D., Weinstock, M. & Flaton, R. (1994). Historical reasoning as theory-evidence 
coordination. In M. Carretero & J. F. Voss (Eds.), Cognitive and instructional 
processes in history and the social sciences(pp. 377-401). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Kuhn, D., Weinstock, M., & Flaton, R. (1994). How well do jurors reason? Competence 
dimensions of individual variation in a juror reasoning task. Psychological 
Science, 5, 289–296. 
 
Lehman, D. R., Lempert, R. O. & Nisbett, R. E. (1988). The effects of graduate training 
On reasoning: Formal discipline and thinking about everyday-life events. 
American Psychologist, 43(6), 431-442. 
 
Lehman, D. R. & Nisbett, R. E. (1990). Longitudinal study of the effects of 
Undergraduate training on reasoning. Developmental Psychology, 26(6), 952-960. 
 
Leshowitz, B. (1989). It is time we did something about scientific illiteracy. 
American Psychologist, 44(8), 1159-1160. 
 
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979). Biased assimilation and attitude 
polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 2098-2109. 
 
Meehl, Paul E. (2002). Cliometicmetatheory: II. Criteria scientists use in theory appraisal 
and why it is rational to do so. Psychological Reports, Vol 91(2), 339-404. 
 
                                                                      
      
 116 
 
Messer, W. S., & Grigges, R. A. (1989). Student belief and involvement in the 
paranormal and performance in introductory psychology. Teaching of Psychology, 
16, 187-191. 
 
Miller, K. (1997, July). Star struck: A journey to the new frontiers of the zodiac. Life, pp. 
39-44, 46, 50. 
 
Paulhus, D. L., & Reid, D. B. (1991). Enhancement and denial in socially desirable 
 responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 307–317. 
 
Perkins, D. N., Jay, E., & Tishman, S. (1993). Beyond abilities: A dispositional theory of  
thinking. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 39(1), 1-21. 
 
Perry, W. G., Jr. (1970).Forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college 
years. Oxford, England: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
 
Petty, R. E., Priester, J. R., & Brinol, P. (2002). Mass media attitude change: Implications 
of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. In J. Bryant & D. Zillmann 
(Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 155-198). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Pithers, R. T., & Soden, R. (2000). Critical thinking in education: A review. Educational 
Research, 42(3), 237-249. 
 
Priester, J. M., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Source attributions and persuasion: Perceived 
honesty as a determinant of message scrutiny. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 21, 637-654. 
 
Robinson, J. P., Shaver, P. R., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1991).Measures of personality and 
 social psychological attitudes (Vol. 1). San Diego, CA: Academic Press, pp. 560–5
 64. 
 
Sá, W., Kelley, C., Ho, C., & Stanovich, K. E. (2005). Thinking about personal theories: 
individual differences in the coordination of theory and evidence. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 38, 1149-1161. 
 
Sá, W. C., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (1999). The domain specificity and generality 
of belief bias: Searching for a generalizable critical thinking skill. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 91(3), 497-510. 
 
Schommer, M., & Walker, K. (1995). Are epistemological beliefs similar across 
domains? Journal of Educational Psychology, 87(3), 424-432. 
 
Schwartz, D. L. & Bransford, J. D. (1998).A time for telling. Cognition and Instruction, 
16(4), 475-522. 
 
                                                                      
      
 117 
 
Solomon, G. & Perkins, D. N. (1989). Rocky roads to transfer: Rethinking mechanisms 
of a neglected phenomenon. Educational Psychology, 24(2), 113-142. 
 
Stanovich, K. E. & West, R. F. (1997). Reasoning independently of prior belief and 
individual differences in actively open-minded thinking. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 89(2), 342-357. 
 
Toplak, M. E., &Stanovich, K. E. (2003). Associations between myside bias on an 
informal reasoning task and amount of post-secondary education. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 17(7), 851-860. 
 
Troldahl, V., & Powell, F. (1965).A short-form dogmatism scale for use in field studies. 
Social Forces, 44, 211–215. 
 
Vosniadou, S. (1994). Capturing and modeling the process of conceptual change. 
Learning and Instruction, 4(1), 45-69. 
 
Weinstock, M. P., Neuman, Y., & Glassner, A. (2006). Identification of Informal 
Reasoning Fallacies as a Function of Epistemological Level, Grade Level, and 
Cognitive Ability. Journal of Educational Psychology, 98(2), 327-341. 
 
Weisberg, D. S., Keil, F. C., Goodstein, J., Rawson, E., Gray, J. R. (2008). 
The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations .Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience 20, 470-477. 
 
Zimmerman, C. (2000). The development of scientific reasoning skills. Developmental 
Review,20, 99-149. 
 
Zimmerman, C. (2005). The Development of Scientific Reasoning Skills:   
What Psychologists Contribute to an Understanding of Elementary Science 
Learning. Washington, D. C.: National Research Council Committee on Science 
Learning Kindergarten through Eighth Grade. 
 
 
 
 
 
